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Project Document

Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad

August 2019



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Project Title: Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad
 Project Number: To be defined
 Implementing Partner: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
 Start Date: 1 September 2019 End Date: 31 August 2021 PAC Meeting date: 30 July 2019

Brief Description
<p>The nexus of humanitarian-development-peace issues around Lake Chad consequent upon an intractable extremist insurgency has left tens of thousands of people dead, approximately 2.5 million displaced, and more than 10 million people in the region affected and in need.</p> <p>While robust national and multi-national military operations have re-taken territory previously controlled by Boko Haram, a new approach is required to consolidate these gains and establish the conditions necessary to transition from military to civilian responsibility for security, and from the provision of humanitarian assistance to the resumption of stalled development processes. The Facility herein has two result areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Immediate stabilisation of specific areas, cleared of Boko Haram and other armed group control, but where communities remain vulnerable to continued infiltration and attack; and 2. Initiation of extended stabilisation activities across the Boko Haram-affected States and Regions, through support to implementation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) Regional Stabilisation Strategy. <p>UNDP will deliver on scale, speed and coverage by optimising the interplay of civil-military coordination; efficient and fast operations following special UNDP procedures; and autonomous decision-making for the national teams.</p> <p>The expected results will be met through the achievement of six outputs in the target areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Security and the Rule of Law improved; 2. Essential infrastructure and basic services functioning; 3. Livelihood opportunities available for all households; 4. Enhanced capacities of the LCBC to implement the Regional Stabilisation Strategy; 5. Improved Regional Stabilisation Strategy coordination and cooperation; and 6. State/Region Territorial Action Plans in place.

<p>Contributing to Outcome of RPD:</p> <p>Regional Programme for Africa, Outcome 3: <i>Countries & regions are able to reduce the likelihood of conflict arising from violent extremism.</i></p>	Total resources required:		USD 100,000,000.00
	Total resources allocated:	UNDP:	USD 3,000,000.00
		Donor: Germany	Approx. USD 44,042,000.00 (EUR 40,000,000.00)
		Donor: Sweden	Approx. USD 8,150,000.00 (SEK 80,000,000.00)
		Donor: EU	Approx. USD 5,505,000.00 (EUR 5,000,000.00)
		Donor: UK	Approx. USD 2,430,000.00 (GBP 2,000,000.00)
Unfunded:		USD 36,873,000.00	

Agreed by (signatures):


UNDP

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Date: 16/9/2019

Table of Contents

I.	DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE	5
1.1	SECURITY CONTEXT	5
1.2	CONFLICT IMPACT AND CHALLENGES.....	6
1.3	REGIONAL RESPONSES	9
1.4	THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE	10
II.	STRATEGY	12
2.1	RESULT AREAS AND NATURE OF THE INTERVENTION	12
2.1.1	<i>Results</i>	12
2.1.2	<i>Achieving scale and an integrated approach</i>	13
2.1.3	<i>Speed of response</i>	14
2.1.4	<i>Coverage - the selection of target areas</i>	14
2.1.5	<i>Cross-border cooperation</i>	16
2.2	THEORY OF CHANGE	16
2.3	AN AREA-BASED APPROACH	19
2.3.1	<i>Civil-military coordination and the preparation of Joint Action Plans (JAPs)</i>	19
2.3.2	<i>Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and the New Way of Working</i>	20
2.3.3	<i>Environment and conflict</i>	21
2.4	WINNING THE PEACE	22
2.4.1	<i>Community engagement</i>	22
2.4.2	<i>Conflict Sensitivity and Doing No Harm</i>	23
2.4.3	<i>The imperative of a rights-based approach</i>	24
2.4.4	<i>Visibility and strategic communications</i>	24
2.5	PROMOTING OWNERSHIP AND WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP.....	25
2.5.1	<i>Communities and civil society</i>	25
2.5.2	<i>National and local government</i>	26
2.5.3	<i>Regional and continental institutions</i>	27
2.5.4	<i>The international community</i>	28
III.	RESULTS & PARTNERSHIPS	29
3.1	RESULT AREA 1 - IMMEDIATE STABILISATION	29
3.1.1	<i>Output 1 – Community safety and security improved</i>	29
3.1.2	<i>Output 2 - Essential infrastructure & basic services functioning</i>	37
3.1.3	<i>Output 3 - Livelihood opportunities available</i>	40
3.2	RESULT AREA 2 – EXTENDED STABILISATION	43
3.2.1	<i>Output 4 - Enhanced capacities of LCBC to implement the RSS</i>	43
3.2.2	<i>Output 5 - Improved cross-border cooperation and coordination</i>	46
3.2.3	<i>Output 6 – State and Region Territorial Action Plans developed</i>	47
3.3	RESOURCES REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE EXPECTED RESULTS.....	51
3.4	PARTNERSHIPS	52
3.4.1	<i>The Framework for UN intervention</i>	52
3.4.2	<i>UNDP work at regional and national Level</i>	53
3.4.3	<i>Other actors</i>	54
3.5	RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS	54
3.5.1	<i>Security risks</i>	55
3.5.2	<i>Political risks</i>	56
3.5.3	<i>Operational risks</i>	56

3.5.4	<i>Reputational risks</i>	57
3.6	STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT.....	61
3.6.1	<i>A focus on youth</i>	61
3.6.2	<i>Addressing the situation of women & girls</i>	62
3.7	SOUTH-SOUTH AND TRIANGULAR COOPERATION	63
3.8	KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT	63
3.9	SUSTAINABILITY AND SCALING UP	64
IV.	PROJECT MANAGEMENT	65
4.1	COST EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS	65
4.2	THE PROJECT SET-UP.....	66
4.2.1	<i>Offices</i>	66
4.2.2	<i>Four national teams</i>	66
4.2.3	<i>Regional coordination and support to LCBC</i>	66
4.2.4	<i>Ensuring an immediate start</i>	67
4.2.5	<i>Collaborative arrangements with other interventions</i>	67
4.2.6	<i>Monitoring and Evaluation</i>	68
4.2.7	<i>Project assurance and audit arrangements</i>	68
4.2.8	<i>Resource Mobilisation</i>	69
V.	RESULTS FRAMEWORK	70
VI.	MONITORING AND EVALUATION	73
6.1	MONITORING PLAN	73
6.2	EVALUATION PLAN	74
VII.	MULTI-YEAR WORK PLAN	75
VIII.	GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS	79
8.1	FUNDING MODALITIES.....	79
8.2	GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS.....	79
8.2.1	<i>RSF Technical Coordination Committee</i>	80
8.2.2	<i>Partner Platforms</i>	80
IX.	LEGAL CONTEXT AND RISK MANAGEMENT	82
9.1	LEGAL CONTEXT STANDARD CLAUSES.....	82
X.	RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARD CLAUSES	82
XI.	ANNEXES	85

I. Development Challenge

1.1 Security Context

This year, 2019, marks the 10th anniversary of the extra-judicial killing of Mohamed Yusuf in police custody in Borno State, Nigeria, and the advent of a new and deadly phase in the evolution of Boko Haram. Since 2015, a more muscular response from the national Governments, combined with coordinated military action through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), has been largely successful in degrading Boko Haram's capacity to maintain control of territory in which it operates. Although the last year has seen a marked deterioration in the security environment again.

By March 2018, two main insurgent factions were still active, and continued to wage an insurgency campaign against the government: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), an armed opposition group (AOG)¹, labelled by the media and commonly referred to as "Boko Haram", operating mainly out of southern Borno State; Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which split from Boko Haram in 2016, and which is based close to Lake Chad itself and along Nigeria's northern border with Niger.

Since 2016, ISWAP has differentiated itself from JAS through the development of strategy and tactics that mark it as potentially a more sophisticated and formidable opponent. Unlike JAS, ISWAP seeks to avoid unnecessary violence and exploitation against civilian populations, and has introduced a level of governance, including administration of justice, control of commodities and provision of social welfare. An April 2019 report by the Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation (GICS) identifies the main success of ISWAP as its ability to effectively appeal to and co-opt local networks, while blending a globalist caliphate messaging with local grievances, competently using it to establish legitimacy in the eyes of local communities².

ISWAP launched a major offensive in January 2019 that has resulted in the overrunning of a number of military bases in Nigeria, large-scale displacement of local populations and a consolidation of territory under ISWAP's nominal control where the Nigerian government and military are not present. In addition, it is likely that the attacks have increased insurgent capability still further, given the loss of military weapons, ammunition, vehicles and other equipment.

Renewed attacks are not limited to Nigeria: in March 2019, separate attacks killed eight civilians at Kiridi in south-eastern Niger in the Diffa region bordering Lake Chad, and left 23 dead at Dangdala, on the north-eastern shore of the Lake, the deadliest attack in Chad to date. Thirty-seven soldiers and civilians were killed in an attack in Darak, Far North region of Cameroon on 10th June.

Changes in ISWAP tactics, growing concerns of coordination between the ISWAP and JAS factions, and external support from Islamic State and Al Qaeda, and the increased number of violent incidences since

¹ For the purposes of this document, JAS, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and other armed groups that oppose the Government of Nigeria through violent means will be referred to as "Armed Opposition Groups" (AOGs).

² *Survival and Expansion: the Islamic State's West Africa Province*, Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation, April 2019.

the last quarter of 2018, is raising fears that the security situation is once again deteriorating, and that urgent action is required to prevent a significant resurgence of the crisis.

1.2 Conflict Impact and Challenges

At least 35,000 people have been killed since the inception of the conflict, and UN OCHA ranks the humanitarian emergency as one of the four worst humanitarian crises globally, with 2.4 million people displaced, 5 million food insecure people at crisis and emergency levels, and millions of civilians subjected to extreme hardship. In the four Lake Chad countries, 17.4 million people live in areas affected by the crisis and 10.7 million are in need.

While affected by the same crisis, the situation differs from country to country in the Lake Chad Basin. The below table 1, which is partially based on hard data and partially on estimations from the field level, provides a detailed overview:

Table 1: Situation overview in the four countries

	Country ³	NE Nigeria	Cameroon	Chad	Niger
1	Affected population	12,000,000	4,000,000	518,000	704,000
2	No. of Refugees	200,000 (returning refugees)	363,710 (100,504 from Nigeria)	93,000	117,927
3	No. of IDPs	1,718,700	227,581	108,400	55,900
4	Estimated No. of Vigilantes	15,600	5,200	1,300	
5	Estimated No. of people associated with BH	7,000	4000	1500	1,500
6	Level of destruction in target areas	High	Medium	Low	Medium
7	Severely food insecure people	7,800,000	419,000	500,000	2,100,000
8	Local Governance Structures in target areas	Displaced and dysfunctional	Affected, partially functional	Partially affected, but functional	Affected, partially functional
9	Access to Justice in target areas	Very limited	Limited	Partial	Limited
10	Community Security in target areas	Very low	Low	Moderate	Low

³Sources for 1,2,3, 12: OCHA Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview (as of 26 July 2018); Estimates for 4, 5 and 11 based on ICG and Control Risk 2017. Source for 6: UN / WB / EU RPBA 2016. Source for 7: Revised Requirement and Response Priorities (September 2018). Estimates for 8, 9 and 10: From UNDP field colleagues and World Justice Project 2017.

11	Level of violence in target areas	Very high (regular attacks, high density)	High - medium (frequent attacks, medium density)	Medium - low (sporadic attacks, low density)	Medium (sporadic attacks, medium density)
12	Humanitarian access	Adamawa: Accessible; Yobe: Accessible to Restricted access; Borno: Restricted to No access	Limited in isolated areas	Satisfactory	Limited in isolated areas

The security situation remains highly volatile, and the conflict is flaring up again in areas previously considered secure. The JAS faction overran and destroyed the refugee town of Rann near the border to Cameroon in January, displacing its inhabitants yet again. Thousands of Nigerian refugees were forcibly returned by the Cameroonian authorities. In total, militant attacks in northeastern Nigeria have forced almost 60,000 people to flee since November, the largest number for more than two years, more than half of them as a result of the Rann incident.

In other rural areas security has been restored, but recovery has yet to start. The transition to recovery is often precarious. When humanitarian aid provision ceases while the enabling environment for recovery and development is not yet in place or is insufficiently supported, vulnerable groups are at risk of falling back into insecurity, and to once again become exposed to violence, abuse or harassment. The challenge is to establish a working methodology for immediate stabilisation that must encompass the phased transition of insecure areas toward greater security and early recovery, and the reduction of current volatility whereby previously secure areas have become more rather than less vulnerable.

It is unlikely that security responses alone, however, will be sufficient to address the complex factors that gave rise to the insurgency, and which continues to sustain it. These include a structural and persistent development deficit, with development indicators far below national averages in all of the four countries. Many communities never had schools, health clinics or water supply infrastructure or other services. The long-term failure of governance and absence of the formal State is increasingly compounded by a perceived failure of traditional leaders to stand by their communities and accusations of their collusion in aspects of the war economy.

For most in the region, military forces have been the primary interface between local communities and the State over the past decade. While in some areas the military remains highly regarded, in other areas operations have been characterized by a heavy-handed approach and serious violations of human rights. A culture of impunity and lack of accountability mechanisms continues to undermine national counter-insurgency efforts and inhibits international responses in support.

Economic and mobility restrictions imposed by the military, designed to block revenue flow to armed opposition groups, have in practice led to severe restrictions in freedom of movement, affecting a great deal of economic activity, including, *inter alia*, the use of motor taxis, the trade in certain types of food and fuel, access to land for farmers and pastoralists, and the operation of markets in more remote villages and towns. Commerce-related infrastructure has been deliberately targeted by armed opposition groups, and the closure of borders for security purposes has further constrained local economies and livelihoods while driving up the cost of basic commodities. Humanitarian aid has developed as a new domain of economic activity, creating new challenges of dependence, unpredictability and local 'war economies' that are becoming entrenched as the 'new normal'.

Displacement and demographic change exacerbate the challenge. Limited public services are concentrated in urban areas, and – in line with global experience – many of those displaced from rural communities are unlikely to want to return. The urban economy provides more diverse opportunities for the increasingly young workforce: over 0.5 million young people enter the labour market each year; 60% of them in North Eastern Nigeria. Lack of voice and agency of youth contributes to their perceived and real social marginalization. It seems likely that globalization processes, the spread of mobile phones and mobile internet connectivity, have played a role in transforming a mix of grievances about governance shortfall, corruption, political and social marginalization and exclusion of certain groups, into a recruitment platform for violent extremism and armed opposition.

The Lake Chad Basin has historically had a poor record of women’s empowerment including low school enrolment, preponderance of early marriages for girls and poor participation of women in public life. The region’s deep-rooted patriarchal norms, often codified in law and reinforced by socio-cultural institutions, have defined women’s status through marriage and childbearing and confined them to gender roles that do not go beyond the domestic sphere.

The conflict has further exacerbated these discriminatory practices and increased insecurity for women and girls who have been victims of violence and abuse from formal and informal security providers as well as armed opposition groups. Sexual and gender-based violence is endemic across the conflict-affected regions. Harassment of women and girls has been reported in both IDP Camps and host communities, often in the course of conducting daily domestic chores such as fetching water or firewood or whilst using latrines and showers. With rampant hunger and malnutrition, displaced women are often forced to resort to negative coping mechanisms including survival/transactional sex to provide income for their families.

Rebuilding the social contract and regaining the trust of the population is a challenge that requires visible government effort, sustained community engagement, and improved accountability and transparency of security providers. While root causes of the conflict are many and varied, priority must be given to re-establishing the presence as well as the authority of the State: a ‘peace dividend’ of essential infrastructure and basic services, facilitation of access to livelihoods and the establishment of conditions for private sector development and job creation. The key focus must be on improving conditions for youth in general, and for women and girls in particular, and to ensure that all activity conforms to a gender strategy with protection and empowerment at its heart.

A specific layer of complexity for the Lake Chad region is that it straddles four countries, two regional economic communities, two countries that are landlocked and two countries that invest more in the development of their coastal regions than their Sahelian interior⁴. The region has huge potential as a hub for farming, livestock and fisheries, not just in primary production, but also in the cross-border trade and services economy that links production areas to markets. Prior to the insurgency, Northeast Nigeria did more trade across national borders than it did with the rest of Nigeria⁵. Nascent efforts to enhance cross-border cooperation to resuscitate and develop cross-border trade, within a broader

⁴ As noted in the Outcome Document, Lake Chad Multi-Disciplinary Expert Meeting on Livelihoods and Water, The Hague, 18-19 February 2019.

⁵ Northeast Nigeria Joint Livelihood and Market Recovery Assessment, 2017. (USAID, Mercy Corps, Action Against Hunger, Cooperazione Internazionale, Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam).

common framework for addressing the root causes of the crisis, should be fully supported with appropriate advocacy, capacity development and resources.

This cooperation needs to design and implement plans for natural resource management in the targeted areas. The populations living in the Lake Chad Basin depend heavily on the Lake Chad for their livelihoods (ie. access to water for farming, livestock rearing and drinking, fishing, hunting), but pressure on these resources is increasing significantly, because of intensified extraction and, more importantly, climate change. This has caused the shrunk of water surface over the past four decades (from 25,000 km² to only 2,500 km²), heavily impacting the economic activities and food security in the Lake Basin. It is expected that the reduced availability of water will further trigger conflicts between communities, who seek water for survival, and might therefore be more inclined to associate with Boko Haram to find alternative solutions for subsistence.

1.3 Regional Responses

National governments of the four riparian countries have led response to the crisis to date.

In Nigeria, the Buhari Plan of 2016 provides the overarching framework for engagement in the Northeast of the country. Operation Lafiya Dole registered significant military progress against the insurgency; the establishment of Operation Safe Corridor provides rehabilitation and reintegration support to low-risk Boko Haram-associated persons, and, more recently, the creation of the North-East Development Commission (NEDC) will coordinate efforts to tackle the root causes of the crisis.

Cameroon has deployed thousands of troops under Operation Alpha, Operation Emergence 4 and joint operations with neighbouring countries in an attempt to curtail the growing security threats in the Far North Region. In 2016, Chad began close cooperation and collaboration with its neighbours, sending two thousand troops to Niger to support counter-insurgency efforts in the Diffa Region—the region in Niger which has been most affected by the crisis.

Recognizing that security efforts need to be coupled with development solutions, Niger set up demobilization sites in 2016 and has adopted a special and comprehensive security and stabilization framework – “*Projet de Stratégie de Sortie de Crise de Terrorisme dans la Région de Diffa*”⁶ for the support of the Diffa Region. This initiative is part of the broader security and development strategy for the Sahel and provides a framework for how Diffa can begin to build on the successes registered by the security response in order to entrench and consolidate stability and peace.

Aside from these nationally driven efforts, all four Lake Chad countries, along with the Republic of Benin, have increased their military cooperation under the auspices of the AU-mandated Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF, whose mandate was expanded in 2015 to more effectively combat the insurgency in and around Lake Chad, has been a critical force in enhancing the security response to the crisis, particularly with regard to strengthening cross-border collaboration among the countries affected by the crisis.

⁶ Conseil National de Sécurité : *Projet de Stratégie de Sortie de Crise de Terrorisme dans la Région de Diffa* ; 2018, Cabinet du Premier Ministre, République du Niger

Produced under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, with the support of the African Union and UNDP, the LCBC *Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin* was approved by the Member States of LCBC on 30th August 2018 and endorsed by the AU Peace & Security Council on 5th December 2018. The Strategy is intended to fulfil the second phase of the MNJTF mandate, as highlighted in the Strategic Concept of Operations of the Force, namely to “*facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs and refugees*”. It seeks to establish a common approach and an inclusive framework for all stakeholders to support a timely, coordinated, and effective transition from stabilization to medium and longer-term recovery, peacebuilding and development processes.

The LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy recognises that the crisis around Lake Chad “... *offers both opportunity and obligation to operationalise the “New Way of Working” called for at the World Humanitarian Summit of 2016.*” LCBC presented the Strategy at the High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region hosted by Germany, Nigeria, Norway, and the UN (OCHA and UNDP) in Berlin, September 2018. The conference marked a new chapter in the new way of working as humanitarian, peacebuilding development needs were all part of the conference, departing from the strictly humanitarian approach of the previous Oslo conference on Lake Chad. The combined approach was well-received and resulted in an increase in funding for both humanitarian and development interventions⁷.

1.4 The International Response

The Lake Chad crisis is proving intractable, and in danger of deteriorating further as non-state armed groups change tactics, channel international support, and regain the initiative. Current responses are considered too slow and too limited, both in nature, coordination, and in territorial reach, and do not in any case aim to take a stabilisation approach to the situation.

Four immediate and essential changes are called for:

1. The recent deterioration in the security situation, and the need to avert a renewed wave of the crisis, requires a *faster and more agile response* from Governments and the international community. Military operations to clear areas from extremist control or incursion need to lead to more immediate stabilisation interventions that bring ‘peace dividends’, increase freedom of movement and facilitate a return to normalcy, lifting security restrictions that curtail the ability of the population to pursue their livelihoods and enabling the military to move on to other areas where the process can be repeated.
2. In parallel, the *scale and nature of assistance* must be recalibrated to address needs beyond the simple provision of humanitarian assistance. While the provision of humanitarian aid will remain essential for the foreseeable future, current levels of support to stabilisation, recovery

⁷ Some \$2.17 billion in grants were announced (and \$467 million in concessional loans). Of the total figure, some \$1.068 billion (49% of total grants) was made available for humanitarian action, while the peace-building and sustainable development related pledges amounted to USD 1.107 bn. (51%).

and development activities fall short of what is required to make a difference given the size of the territory to be covered, and the number of vulnerable communities. Development actors remain absent, or have only recently established offices, in the key areas of the four countries affected by armed opposition groups. Improved civil-military cooperation is a prerequisite, particularly in Nigeria, along with increased civil-military coordination between the local Government, military and humanitarian and development actors.

3. *Coverage* remains a key issue, both for humanitarian and development assistance. Large areas of territory, particularly in Borno State in Nigeria, remain outside of effective Government control, with limited access for humanitarian (and development) actors. In Nigeria, an estimated 823,000 people are in areas inaccessible by humanitarian groups.⁸ In the other LCB countries, security restrictions in the affected border areas continue to constrain access and activity.
4. A more systematic, *cross-border approach* is required. The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has adopted an increasingly important role as a key diplomatic platform for sub-regional response to the insurgency, and its capacities should be further developed in this regard. The LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy must be supported to address the transnational nature of the security threat, the need for cooperation in regard to refugee displacement and return, and to exploit early recovery and development opportunities that leverage traditional patterns of cross-border mobility and trade.

⁸ Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan 2019-2021.

II. Strategy

2.1 Result areas and nature of the intervention

The Stabilisation Facility proposed herein is intended to provide a new approach, calibrated to respond to the challenges identified: the need for a step-change in the scale and nature of intervention, in speed of response, increased territorial coverage, and improved regional cooperation.

The Facility will enhance civil-military cooperation to design and implement Joint Action Plans for the immediate stabilisation of specific target areas, to increase community safety and security as well as provide infrastructure, basic services and livelihood opportunities as a rapid-response package. It will also underwrite LCBC and African Union implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, strengthening coherence and coordination of response to the Lake Chad crisis, and establishing the mechanism and process required to operationalise the *New Way of Working* and a transition from provision of humanitarian assistance to development and resilience.

National windows of the Facility, serviced by country-specific Partner Platforms and autonomous UNDP teams, will ensure that the immediate stabilisation effort is well targeted and fully owned by relevant stakeholders in each country. UNDP will build on its successful experience of stabilisation programming in Iraq and Libya to put in place fast-track business processes and will establish Facility Service Centres in each country to provide the dedicated operational support necessary to achieve fast and effective delivery.

2.1.1 Results

The overall expected result of Facility intervention is stabilisation of the insurgency-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin.

UNDP defines stabilisation as a time bound, localised, integrated civilian programme of activities with the primary purpose of extending State presence and establishing minimum security conditions, essential services and livelihood opportunities necessary to sustain the peace and allow longer-term social cohesion and development processes to achieve momentum and impact⁹.

Conceptually, therefore, UNDP divides stabilisation into two phases: immediate stabilisation activities that can consolidate and build peace, with demonstrable progress within a short timeframe of 1.5-3 years; 'extended' stabilisation or early recovery activities, to be initiated in parallel, but which achieve tangible results over a longer, 3 to 5-year timeframe.

This conceptual distinction determines the two result areas of the Facility herein:

1. Immediate stabilisation of specific target areas, cleared of control by armed opposition groups, but where communities remain vulnerable to continued infiltration and attack; and

⁹ The Strategy of the Facility, its work and implementation modalities, build upon UNDP's global experience of stabilisation and lessons learned. These are outlined in the Concept Note for the Facility, attached to this project document as Annex 1.

2. Strengthening of the extended stabilisation process, through implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, facilitating transition from humanitarian assistance to longer-term processes for development and resilience.

2.1.2 Achieving scale and an integrated approach

The Facility is intended as a multi-donor action, establishing a pooled funding mechanism for donor partners to achieve the necessary scale of response required for stabilisation in the Lake Chad Basin.

Result area 1 of the Facility, Immediate Stabilisation of specific target areas, builds on UNDP experience in Iraq and elsewhere to offer activities to secure the following three outputs understood as the basis of successful stabilisation:

- *Community Safety and Security improved* - Establishing public confidence in the State security umbrella is a prerequisite for the stabilisation of the Lake Chad region. Improved civil-military coordination is intended to achieve a joined-up approach between the Facility and military authorities, national law enforcement agencies and Governments at the State/Region level to establish a sequenced transition from military to civilian control in selected target areas. The Facility will support extension of the civilian law enforcement umbrella – police, immigration, and Customs authorities – and build capacities of community security providers to defend against infiltration and attack by armed opposition groups (Output 1).
- *Essential Infrastructure & Basic Services functioning* - Reinstating regularly functioning services is perhaps the single most likely factor that can render neighbourhoods liveable and renew the social contract between communities and the State. Sub-national authorities and UNDP Facility staff and implementing partners will work together with community representatives of the target areas to define needs and design response packages (see Output 2).
- *Livelihood Options available* - To consolidate the peace, affected areas must be made 'liveable' through improved ability for people to generate income and sustain themselves. The Facility aims to provide every household in the target area access to livelihood and job opportunities and minimum income, to address acute levels of poverty, to combat radicalisation and recruitment processes, and to kick-start recovery of the local economy (see Output 3).

Many of the activities envisaged to secure the outcomes necessary to immediate stabilisation are already being implemented by UNDP or other actors – the aim of the Facility is to increase effectiveness by delivering them together as a package, in a rapid and flexible manner, in more vulnerable areas where such assistance is currently piecemeal or absent.

2.1.3 Speed of response

In light of lessons learned in the stabilisation of Somalia, Iraq and elsewhere, the Facility must move at speed to consolidate military gains and re-establish civilian control of target areas. Failure to move quickly risks alienating, or even endangering, local populations and losing the ideological struggle against extremism¹⁰.

The Facility will act as a rapid-response mechanism that relevant authorities can sequence with military operations, to ensure immediate follow-up in specific locations and curtail the ability of armed opposition groups to re-infiltrate and exploit any security vacuum or community perceptions of non-responsive Government.

Joint Action Plans (See Section 2.3.1) will be prepared between the military, national and State authorities, and UNDP within six weeks of target area selection. The Joint Action Plans will coordinate and sequence rapid transition from military to civilian security and governance, a process to be launched immediately and completed within an 18-month timeframe.

UNDP does not consider immediate stabilisation work as regular development programming. While the Facility is designed as a rapid-response mechanism, however, the need to move at speed must still be balanced by a commitment to minimum levels of participatory planning and preparatory assessment if the overall goal is to be achieved.

UNDP's previous experience in stabilisation validates the agency's ability and agility to facilitate quick and reliable delivery. UNDP has acquired institutional capacity and in-house know-how to put in place special measures with *dedicated* operations support for the Facility, which will support expedited processes while ensuring transparency, value for money, accountability, effectiveness of partnerships and quality assurance (see chapter 4).

2.1.4 Coverage - the selection of target areas

The immediate stabilisation activities of the Facility are intended to benefit areas and communities that are considered vulnerable to infiltration and attack by armed opposition groups, extending an organised and effective civilian security umbrella, consolidating military progress with development 'dividends' for the local population and allowing the military to redirect its efforts to new areas.

In the Far North of Cameroon, the Facility will focus on border communities, with a view to stabilizing key communities to which a high number of displaced persons need to return, and that can sustain a trade corridor linking Chad via Kousseri to Nigeria via Amchidee-Banki Border Crossing Point. Increased cross-border trade, formal and informal, between local markets in the three countries will provide an important boost to local livelihoods and could in time be developed to act as a key conduit for resumption of the economically significant export of cattle from Chad to Maidaguri. Similarly, in the North region of Cameroon, the Facility will focus upon communities in the May Oulo sub-division given

¹⁰ For more on lessons learned from UNDP global experience on stabilisation, please see Regional Stabilisation Facility Concept Note, December 2018.

the high number of IDPs, its immediate proximity to the border with Nigeria, and the potential for immediate and extended stabilisation on a cross-border basis.

In Chad, the Facility is intended to have a particular focus on stabilisation of the islands of Lake Chad, which is used as a safe haven by armed opposition groups, and where communities have been subject to repeated attacks. In Hajder Lamis region, target communities may include Guité, Mahada, Mani, Meteriné and the islands of Goré-Nibeck, Goré-Bofa, Goré-Ngayé, Goré-Kembelo; Goré-Nilfo, and Goré-Amsokoro; in Region du Lac, mainland towns such as Baga Sola and Bol, and island communities Fouli, Mamdi, Kaya and Kouloudia Departments.

Diffa Region of Niger comprises 6 departments and 12 Communes, of which eight (Bosso, Kablewa, Nguigmi, Gueskerou, Chetimari, Diffa, Foulatari and Toumour) are considered directly affected by the conflict, and in need of immediate stabilisation activities. The Facility will focus on Bossa, Kablewa, Nguigmi and Toumour, which were subject to assessment and planning exercises under the ongoing German Government-funded UNDP intervention, *Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin*.

In Nigeria, the Facility will cover the three "BAY" states in the North-East, namely Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, where the security situation differs significantly from State to State, and between the Local Government Areas (LGAs) that comprise them: in Borno State, Maiduguri is more secure than it was, and some return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their Local Government Authorities (LGAs) of origin has taken place. Up until quite recently, conditions in Yobe seemed to be improving, while Adamawa, except for a small number of attacks in the far north of the state, has been relatively peaceful. Essentially, territory can be classified in three categories: relatively secure areas, where development actors have been able to operate and to initiate early recovery activities; areas beyond the perimeters of garrison towns, where a lack of regular State security presence leaves communities vulnerable to incursion and attack, and restrictions on access apply; areas of Borno State that remain largely inaccessible to humanitarian and development actors. The Facility will target areas in the second category, to be agreed in consultation with Government, military commanders and international partners.

Wherever possible, immediate stabilisation will progress on contiguous territory, in order to better advance freedom of movement (considered as a useful proxy for a certain level of community security necessary to the ability to resume provision of Government services and for the local population to engage safely in livelihood activities).

Within all affected States/Regions, the final selection of target communities for Facility's immediate stabilisation intervention is understood as a matter for leadership of national authorities, based as it must be upon political considerations, military concept of operations, and availability of the necessary State and military resources to make the intervention a success. UNDP will agree selection criteria with national authorities to address: 1) the requirement to demonstrate 'proof of concept', in line with the typology of target areas in terms of levels of security; 2) resources available, per output and donor earmarking; 3) objective needs-based justification to avoid any perceptions of favouritism or political gain; 4) any ongoing and planned activities of other actors. UNDP will provide relevant authorities with information in regard to available Facility resources as soon as known. Selection is requested

immediately upon launch of the Facility, necessitating prior discussions and agreement between Government authorities.

2.1.5 Cross-border cooperation

Result area 2 of the Facility, Strengthening the extended stabilisation process through support to implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, comprises activities to secure a further three outputs, aimed at achieving the desired outcome of enhanced regional ownership, cooperation and coordination:

- 1) LCBC capacities for Strategy implementation enhanced. The Facility will build the capacities of LCBC to manage implementation of the Regional Strategy through support to the establishment of a dedicated LCBC Stabilisation Secretariat, through provision of technical advisory services in partnership with the African Union, and through a sub-project to strengthen LCBC business process to international standard.
- 2) Cooperation forums of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy operational. The Facility will provide the financial means for LCBC, with support of the African Union, to plan and implement the cross-border and mechanisms and processes outlined in the Regional Stabilisation Strategy as necessary to its implementation, for the first two years of the five-year Strategy duration.
- 3) Regional Strategy Territorial Action Plans for the Boko Haram-affected States/Regions developed and coordination mechanisms functioning. The Facility will provide the operational structure and undertake the activities necessary in the affected States/Regions to ensure that the Strategy is localised as a coherent and coordinated overarching framework for multi-partner intervention in the region, aimed at long-term stabilisation and a transition from the provision of humanitarian assistance to development and resilience.

2.2 Theory of change

The Theory of Change for stabilisation of the Lake Chad region is formulated as follows:


- *If* trained civilian administration and law enforcement actors are deployed in target areas in sufficient numbers and with the right resources, *and*
- *If* any informal community security providers are regularised, trained, and given the necessary resources and direction, *and*
- *If* they work in coordination with each other and with national military and the MNJTF, *THEN*
 - ✓ Community security will improve *and*
 - ✓ The burden on the military will be reduced, *and*
 - ➔ A sequenced transition from military to civilian responsibility for security will have been achieved.
- *If* community security is improved, *and*

- *If essential infrastructure and basic services are in place, and*
- *If the population has access to livelihoods and the means to sustain themselves, THEN*
 - ✓ The number of people requiring humanitarian assistance will decrease, *and*
 - ✓ Perceptions of State legitimacy will be increased, the social contract renewed, *and*
 - ➔ Immediate stabilisation will have been achieved, allowing the process to be repeated in new areas.
- *If immediate stabilisation can be achieved over a wider territory, and*
- *If Government-led coordination platforms are in place and functioning efficiently, and*
- *If consistent and coherent development planning processes are undertaken, THEN*
 - ✓ Early recovery initiatives can gain traction *and*
 - ✓ The long-term effort can be better targeted and achieve more, *and*
 - ➔ The basis will have been established for effective transition from the provision of humanitarian assistance to development and resilience.

The Assumptions of the Theory of Change are:

- All stakeholders to security are committed and willing to work together to fulfil required roles and coordinate prevention and response activities;
- Sufficient civilian administrators and law enforcement personnel can be deployed to target areas, remain present, and build relations of trust with the communities they serve;
- The envisaged components of immediate stabilisation are enough to rebuild State legitimacy after decades of developmental neglect and the corrosive effect of extremist narratives;
- Humanitarian and development partners accept the primacy of Government coordination and planning within the framework of implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy;
- The Lake Chad region remains the beneficiary of attention and resources from national Governments and the international community.

Figure 2 – Theory of Change Diagram appears



2.3 An area-based approach

In line with UNDP's global experience and lessons learned, UNDP views stabilisation as geographically contained, targeted at areas where a multi-sectoral approach can have maximum impact on the lives of individuals at the community level.

The LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, and the Regional Stabilisation Facility herein, are designed to take an area-based approach.

Areas selected for intervention for immediate stabilisation will be subject to the preparation of short-term Joint Action Plans, as a tool and product of improved civil-military coordination, covering each of the three components of intervention envisaged: security and the rule of law; essential infrastructure and provision of basic services; livelihoods.

The process of extended stabilisation will be organised according to Territorial Action Plans to be developed as per the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, for the key insurgency-affected States or Regions of the Lake Chad Basin. The following States/Regions are identified by the Strategy:

- Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in Nigeria;
- Diffa Region in Niger;
- Region du Lac and Hajder-Lamis Region in Chad;
- The Far North and North Region of Cameroon.

2.3.1 Civil-military coordination and the preparation of Joint Action Plans (JAPs)

"The stabilisation process, however, cannot be achieved by security responses alone; there is a pressing need to better manage the interface between military and civilian actors in the sub-region, to allow increased humanitarian access and a civilian-led stabilisation process that can complement and build upon military efforts, allowing security forces to focus on their primary responsibilities."¹¹

Military authorities, State Government representatives, and UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility staff will work together to prepare a Joint Action Plan (JAP¹²) for each target area no more than six weeks after date of selection. UNDP will ensure inclusive community participation in the formulation process of the JAPs. Successful implementation of the Joint Action Plans should increase the space and improve conditions for the work of 'extended' stabilisation, to be organised through the TAPs process of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy.

JAPs will specify implementation arrangements, timelines for delivery, and budget allocations per activity for each target area. Each Joint Action Plan will be accompanied by Letters of Agreement between UNDP and relevant actors specifying roles and responsibilities and providing the contractual

¹¹ LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, page 21-22

¹² Joint Action Plans (JAPs) will be elaborated under Result Area 1 – Immediate stabilisation and focus on targeted areas only. Under Result Area 2, the Facility will support the elaboration of Territorial Action Plans (TAPs), focusing on the whole of the State and Region. JAPs aim to set the foundations for the successful implementation of TAPs.

basis for disbursement of funds. As a matter of policy, the Facility will give preference to local contractors and local/national CBOs/NGOs as implementing partners (see Section 3.1.2, Activity 2.5).

The delivery of each Joint Action Plan will be subject to on-going internal monitoring by Facility staff in each State team. A final report on implementation of each Joint Action Plan will be produced by the M&E Specialist in each country, for review by partners and for further dissemination via the Regional Strategy Knowledge Management Platform to be established.

The final reports will be informed by:

- Data and trend analysis in regard to number and type of violent incidents in the target area (ACLED);
- Rapid assessment Community Perception Studies on Security at the close of each intervention, comparing results against the baselines established in the first such assessment (see Activity 1.3);
- Partner satisfaction interviews to be conducted with military and State authorities; and
- Reports of human rights organisations monitoring the target areas (see Activity 1.8).

2.3.2 Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and the New Way of Working

The implementation framework for the operationalisation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy comprises a set of eight Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) to be prepared under the authority and guidance of the national Governments through a devolved mechanism that allows Governors' to provide direct oversight and coordination.

Whereas JAPs are focused on *immediate* stabilisation of particular communities and target areas within States/Regions, the TAPs will focus on rationalising and coordinating the process of *extended* stabilisation, within and across the eight States/Regions of the Strategy as a whole. JAPs will be subject to overall TAPs coordination once the latter are prepared, as a bridging tool from provision of humanitarian assistance to longer-term work for development and resilience.

The Facility will fund development of LCBC design guidelines to harmonise preparation of the TAPs in all eight States/Regions, and support State/Region-level administrations to undertake them. The TAPs are not intended to duplicate existing plans, but to build upon, and in some cases rationalise, those already prepared, while identifying gaps and proposing the coordinated support necessary to address them. The goal is to improve coherence and establish a coordinated basis for further intervention under the rubric of extended stabilisation, as well as to ensure a common format, according to the nine work pillars of the LCBC Regional Strategy, that can be collated into an overarching framework for the Lake Chad region, in which cross-border security challenges can be mitigated, and cross-border development opportunities exploited.

As per the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, the Lake Chad Crisis "... offers both opportunity and obligation to operationalise the "New Way of Working" called for at the World Humanitarian Summit of 2016." Under the direction of the LCBC, and with support of the AUC, a Task Force of UN Agencies and other actors will establish joint analysis, pooled data, a results framework and a common monitoring and evaluation framework for the Regional Strategy, for each of the nine pillars which comprise it:

Pillar 1	Political Cooperation
Pillar 2	Security and Human Rights
Pillar 3	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, Reinsertion and Reintegration of Persons associated with Boko Haram
Pillar 4	Humanitarian Assistance
Pillar 5	Governance and the Social Contract
Pillar 6	Socio-Economic Recovery and Environmental Sustainability
Pillar 7	Education, Learning and Skills
Pillar 8	Prevention of Violent Extremism and Building Peace
Pillar 9	Empowerment and Inclusion of Women and Youth

It is likely that the Task Force will be sub-divided into three Working Groups – for security, governance, and resilience – mirroring and building upon the three established Working Groups of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel. Working groups of the Task Force in each country will ensure *thematic* coordination in each State or Region, to compliment the *territorial* coordination to be provided by the Office of each Governor (see Activity 2.3.3).

2.3.3 Environment and conflict

Significant attention needs to be paid to the interaction and impact of conflict-related environmental degradation and climate change if stabilisation interventions are to be successful.

Lake Chad is experiencing seasonal and inter-annual variability in response to higher variability of the climate. It is this variability and uncertainty which is affecting the lives and the resilience of those dependent on the lake.

The three main climate change implications affecting people’s day-to-day lives are:

1. Increased livelihood and food insecurity due to an increase in diseases related to changing temperatures and rainfall patterns affecting crops and cattle.
2. Increased livelihood insecurity and decreased coping capacity to deal with shocks and increased natural resource conflicts due to more unpredictable changes in lake levels affecting people’s ability to plan how, when and what to farm, fish and cultivate.
3. New conflicts over fertile land created by changes in rainfall altering the fertility of different areas of land.

Having quadrupled since the 1960s, the population in the sub-region continues to increase at around 3.5-3% per year, putting additional pressure on limited and fluctuating environmental resources and posing fresh challenges for livelihoods and food security in the region. Demographic change, in conjunction with climate volatility, is increasing competition for natural resources, challenging peace and security in an alarming feedback loop: not only has the insurgency disrupted social and economic life, it has also destroyed vital agricultural infrastructure and expertise, caused degradation in lands, forests, rivers and lakes, and exacerbated the impact of droughts, floods and desertification.

Since 2014, wildlife and other natural resources in this region have been illegally exploited by refugees from neighbouring Nigeria and other displaced communities as a result of the insurgency. Current

illegal exploitation activities are rather unsustainable and must be controlled to avoid possible ecological disaster in the region.¹³

The pressure on natural resources is not just limited to land for farming but also widespread deforestation driven by firewood consumption for cooking. Communities are well aware of the potential impact of deforestation on soil fertility and increased wind speeds but have few alternatives with which to cook food. Particularly in Nigeria, the need for people to go further from populated areas to collect this firewood put them at risk of attack, abduction, rape and killing by insurgents or of being suspected by the military of passing information to armed opposition groups and being otherwise associated with them.

All Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) will be informed by a climate change fragility assessment of the respective State/Region, with the purpose of avoiding malinvestment whilst identifying concrete mitigation measures to support sustainable domestic water supply and resilience of agricultural production. A shift to new crops and agricultural method will be included in curricula of vocational training to be offered under the livelihood component.

In addition, solar energy will be harnessed to provide light and power for community security, entertainment, communication, cooking, pumping of water, and running of education and health facilities as well as other public buildings. Installation and maintenance of solar energy systems will also figure in the vocational training curricula to be offered by the Facility (see Output 3).

2.4 Winning the peace

The Lake Chad insurgency developed from, and is sustained by, communities alienated by decades of development neglect and marginalisation. It is considered necessary to '*win the peace*' in order to win the war – the Facility, and the Regional Stabilisation Strategy it serves, seek to contribute to a renewal of the social contract between the State and the population around Lake Chad¹⁴.

The breakdown of the social contract needs to be understood as a multi-faceted phenomenon that has moved beyond the critical relationship between the State and the citizen, and – as a consequence of the conflict – is also manifesting itself in suspicion of traditional rulers, often seen as complicit in the war economy, in an epidemic of drug abuse amongst young people, and alienation from older generations, and in widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

2.4.1 Community engagement

A key stratagem of the Facility will be to actively engage communities actively in its design, implementation, and accountability mechanisms. To ensure development is community-driven, the

¹³ UNDP/GEF Project Document, "Improving Lake Chad management through building climate change resilience and reducing ecosystem stress through implementation of the Strategic Action Programme for the Lake Chad basin"

¹⁴ See conclusions recorded in the Outcome Document, Lake Chad Multi-Disciplinary Expert Meeting on Livelihoods and Water, The Hague, 18-19 February 2019.

Facility will place significant emphasis on identifying, strengthening and working through inclusive, participatory, gender and age balanced local committees¹⁵ at community level. Local Committees will drive participatory planning and decision-making to define and implement community-defined priorities for both the Joint Action Plans (JAPs) and Territorial Action Plans (TAPs)¹⁶. Strategic communications will ensure community access to information (see below).

At least two representatives from local committees in each target community will be supported to participate in the meetings of the Partner Platform, to ensure the community voice is heard in the initial decision-making process, and to report back to subsequent meetings on Joint Action Plan implementation from the community perspective.

2.4.2 Conflict Sensitivity and *Doing No Harm*

The first aspect of conflict sensitivity requires that UNDP and relevant partners analyse and understand the impact of national and local conflict dynamics on the ability of UNDP and its implementing partners to deliver stabilisation activities. This includes UNDP's political, reputational, organisational, operational and staff risk management approach and focuses on the security aspects and beyond. (See Section 3.5 for a description of risks and possible mitigation measures).

The second aspect of conflict sensitivity considers the impact of UNDP and its implementing partners stabilisation interventions on the various national and local conflicts. This includes and goes beyond the *do-no-harm* approach by explicitly providing support to local actors to transform the conflicts. Stated differently, the Facility will not work around conflict, instead it will work on conflict.

In advance of intervention in each selected target area, a rapid local conflict analysis needs to be undertaken, to map the situation at the granular level necessary to ensure that the proposed intervention is appropriate and fully conforms with the principle of "*do no harm*". It is vital to avoid exacerbating any existing tensions, or – wherever possible – being seen to work through, or otherwise favour, those who have previously abused power.

Community perception studies of the local security situation are also essential because perceptions matter as much as reality if the intervention is to "*win the peace*" by responding to grassroots concern. Such studies should be used to establish baselines against which the overall success of the intervention can be measured.

Programmatically, UNDP will integrate key indicators of divisions and tensions in the regular monitoring activities of the Facility to ensure that exacerbating tensions and trends can quickly be detected. The

¹⁵ UNDP will support the establishment of peace committees (or any other title), depending on the preferences from the respective States and Regions) where no relevant structure exists. In areas where similar structures are functioning, often supported by national and international partners, UNDP and the Facilities' implementing partners will support, strengthen and work through these structures. Henceforth, the generic term 'Peace Committees' will be used for all these community structures. Different Regions and States will have different structures and at different levels of society. The Facility will seek to interact with or promote committees focusing on a) community safety and security b) reconciliation, mediation and conflict resolutions, and c) matters of recovery and development.

¹⁶ Including local government participation with the aim to create trust and build the social contract between the authorities and the involved communities. As security will continue to be an important challenge, coordination with (or inclusion of) representatives of legitimate security forces will be required.

integration of key indicators on tensions within the programme's M&E framework will also ensure feedback into the programme management cycle and allow for review and modification of activities to address deteriorating dynamics within affected communities.

2.4.3 The imperative of a rights-based approach

A rights-based approach to combating extremism is not just a moral imperative, but at the heart of smart counter-insurgency tactics.

Security responses by military forces, police or vigilante groups that pay insufficient respect to human rights risk alienating stressed communities, feeding narratives of radicalisation and undermining their own objectives¹⁷. *Winning the Peace* requires the highest possible levels of accountability of its actors, to mitigate cynicism and to reassure all stakeholders as to the integrity and efficacy of every aspect of the national and regional effort.

The Facility will support human rights monitoring and reporting in the target areas, as part of a broader effort to promote accountability and compliance with all international and continental norms and standards, that nurtures relations of trust and confidence between security providers and local communities (see Activity 1.8).

The Regional Stabilisation Facility will implement the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and ensure proper mitigation mechanisms to identified human rights related risks, ensuring, among others, that implementation does not in any way legitimise institutions or leaders that have been associated with egregious violations of human rights. The HRDDP framework will be used to assess national security actors prior to engagement, establishing the concrete involvement of local human rights actors and actions necessary to build their capacities.

2.4.4 Visibility and strategic communications

Stabilisation is inherently a political undertaking around Lake Chad, challenging extremist narratives of the failure of secular Government and agenda of western assistance. In the relative absence of independent media and public information campaigns, it is considered vital that the Facility has a well-conceived communications strategy, articulated to the overall Communications Plan of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy.

All results achieved will be branded as the result of local and national Government activity, to ensure that credit accrues to the State, and supports renewal of the social contract between the State and local communities. The Facility envisages no local-level visibility for donors or for UNDP as implementing agency. Results achieved should be publicised beyond the immediate target areas of the Facility, as a counter-narrative to the propaganda of armed opposition groups and will be articulated

¹⁷ Findings of UNDP's study *Journey to Extremism in Africa* suggest that for 71% of interviewees, including a significant cohort of ex-Boko Haram fighters, the 'tipping point' which prompted them to turn to violence was Government security actions. *Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, incentives and the tipping point for recruitment*, p. 74, UNDP 2016

to each national chapter of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy strategic communications plan (Activity 4.2).

A clear finding of the 2015 UNDP Perceptions Study in Nigeria was the dearth of information available to local communities in regard to the security situation, national and international responses, as well as relative trust in media, particularly from Western sources.¹⁸ The project will work with local and international media in all Lake Chad countries both to disseminate news and to facilitate public debate in regard to the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy and anticipated prospects and processes for normalisation and development.

Media need to be selected based on penetration, but radio and television are generally considered most influential. Contracts will be provided to film and radio production companies to prepare video and audio material that can be placed with influential media outlets with a view to gaining public confidence in the direction of the stabilisation process as it is bolstered by announcement of Joint Action Plans and reporting of concrete results of implementation in the target areas.

There is a risk that the origin and dissemination of the messages undermines their credibility and simply reinforces extremist narratives instead. Facility efforts will instead focus on stimulating public dialogue on the many aspects of preventing and responding to the crisis. Women-only discussion programmes can stimulate interest in the gender-specific dimensions of the crisis. All voices should be heard in the dialogue; majority public opinion should be relied upon to frame the issue correctly and establish the societal discourse to isolate and refute extremist argument.

2.5 Promoting ownership and working in partnership

The founding principle of the Regional Stabilisation Facility is the importance of ownership and partnership, at all levels. The 'owners' of the Facility are conceived as partners to it – its design, funding and implementation – as all have stakes in meeting the expected results.

As called for by the United Nations General Assembly, UNDP will act as an 'integrator', facilitating effective civil-military cooperation for immediate stabilisation, thematic and territorial coordination with and between UN Agencies and other implementing actors – Governments, NGOs, private sector and civil society – to implement the concept of 'extended' stabilisation set out in the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy.

2.5.1 Communities and civil society

Local communities are the ultimate beneficiaries of the Facility and are viewed as the true owners of it. It is therefore vital to provide a mechanism for communities to engage in the regional stabilisation process. The Facility has been carefully designed to ensure community ownership of the process of immediate stabilisation.

18 Answering the question of which media source informs them about activities of armed groups, 43.2 % of responses favoured local radio-Western satellite channels; 35.1 % favoured Western satellite channels-Internet and social networks; 19.8 % favoured Radio-TV-Western satellite channels-Internet and social network; and 1.8% for local radio-Internet and social networks.

The Facility will work with local communities through the Peace Committees or similar structures to ensure an inclusive, participatory gender and age-balanced approach that reflects community views and responds to community needs. Traditional and religious leaders, as well as ‘organic intellectuals’ respected by their peers, will be mobilised and requested to i) support the targeting of interventions for immediate stabilisation; ii) participate and/or lead dialogue forums to ensure community ‘buy-in’ and voice; iii) represent the community in meetings of the Partner Platforms; iv) actively facilitate the Facility monitoring regime and community satisfaction surveys.

It is also considered important to ensure that local businesses benefit from contracts, and that national and local CBOs and NGOs – often better placed than external actors to deliver sensitive activities in a culturally appropriate way – are given preference over international organisations as potential partners to the work of the Facility.

The Regional Stabilisation Strategy calls for a Regional Civil Society forum to support its implementation. Aggregating civil society representation and advocacy to the sub-regional level can help ensure inclusive representation and advocacy and strengthen the visibility and capacity of regional institutions in regard to improved citizen’s engagement in general¹⁹.

The Facility is intended to be fully compliant with UNDP’s Environmental and Social Safeguards policy. As such, all activities will pass a screening process in terms of possible negative impact, and a grievance redress mechanism (GRM) will be established for communities and individual beneficiaries.

2.5.2 National and local government

National ownership is the foundational principle upon which implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy resides. The LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy was prepared by LCBC at the request of the Member States concerned. The commitment and responsibilities of Governments to the fulfilment of the Strategy is expressed through their membership of the LCBC Council of Ministers to which the Steering Committee for the Regional Stabilisation Strategy will report.

National Governments are understood as partners of the Facility, rather than as beneficiaries of it, with rights as well as obligations in regard to its design, funding and implementation. National Governments will establish new or delegate existing inter-Ministerial bodies to support implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy and appoint National Focal Points for management of the Regional Stabilisation Facility.

Responsible national and sub-national authorities will co-select target areas and communities for Facility intervention and will agree the activities for implementation and the results to be achieved via the Joint Action Plans.

In regard to civil-military cooperation and the security work of the military, the Facility anticipates partnership with military forces as an in-kind contribution to the Facility from each Government concerned. The Facility will liaise closely with military forces in regard to selection of target areas and

¹⁹ The UNDP sub-regional assessment for Central Africa identified these issues as key priorities within a broader need to strengthen the performance and accountability of Central African RECs: *Central Africa: A Region Falling Behind? Re-considering Approaches to Improving Development Outcomes in Central Africa*, UNDP, March 2017, p. 54

as members of any *ad hoc* Security Planning Groups to be established for purposes of enhancing coordination arrangements on security with civilian actors. No financial or other material assistance will be provided by the Facility to the military. The Facility relies upon national military forces to propose and implement military security activities of the proposed Joint Action Plans, in order to keep target areas secure while the transition to civilian law enforcement and community-organised security arrangements is undertaken.

Facility funds will be utilised to support directly the work of national and local Government to organise extension of the civilian security umbrella into the target areas, plan infrastructure renewal and re-establish essential services, and support community access to Facility livelihood activities. National and local service providers will need to ensure that sufficient suitably qualified personnel are recruited and available for deployment according to timelines to be agreed in the Joint Action Plans, in order for police presence to be established and public services to be operational.

The Lake Chad Basin Governors Forum for Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development²⁰ will serve as the primary mechanism for cross-border cooperation as well as domesticating implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, with a view to ensuring that synergies across the sub-region are leveraged, and that cross-border and transboundary solutions to the crisis are effectively explored.

2.5.3 Regional and continental institutions

The LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy was approved by the LCBC Member States on 30th August 2018 and endorsed by the Peace & Security Council of the African Union on 5th December 2018.

With support of the African Union, the LCBC Secretariat will service a Steering Committee to oversee implementation of the Regional Strategy. To this end, supported by the Facility, new Stabilisation Secretariat will be created within the LCBC Secretariat.

The Peace & Security Council of the African Union considers the Strategy an essential step for the Lake Chad Region in realizing the visions outlined by the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the United Nations' Agenda 2030.

The AU-mandated Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) operates under the overall command of the LCBC. The MNJTF remains a critical force in enhancing the security response to the crisis, particularly with regard to strengthening cross-border collaborations among the countries affected by the crisis. Under the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, a joint LCBC-MNJTF Civil Military Cooperation Cell will have a particular focus on planning, sequencing and coordinating initiatives for extending humanitarian access, for the safe cross-border return of refugees, and for the secure opening of borders in support of human mobility and cross-border trade, following bilateral Government agreements to do so.

²⁰ The Lake Chad Governors Forum was inaugurated in May 2018, as an initiative of the Government of Germany-funded UNDP Project, *Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin (Phase I)*.

Building on UNDP-AUC collaboration in facilitating the consultation process and drafting of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, UNDP's primary partner in supporting capacity development of LCBC to implement the Strategy will continue to be the African Union.

In addition to the AU Liaison Office in N'djamena, responsible for political cooperation and coordination with the AU-mandated MNJTF, the AUC has established a technical Coordination Unit for Lake Chad Stabilisation, which will include a Facility-funded senior staff person to be seconded to the LCBC Secretariat in N'djamena as Head of the Stabilisation Secretariat.

UNDP will work closely with the AUC team, and facilitate their engagement with LCBC through funding of AUC participation in planning meetings and RSS events.

The Regional Stabilisation Strategy notes the key role that Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have to play in ensuring that sub-regional frameworks complement rather than duplicate or conflict with regional frameworks agreed upon in the context of the AU. As such, the Facility will work with LCBC and the AU to ensure that ECOWAS, ECCAS, CEMAC and EUMOA are all appropriately engaged in activities for coordination and harmonisation via their participation in the RSS Steering Committee.

2.5.4 The international community

In addition to comprising the International Support Group for the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, with representation on the Strategy Steering Committee, donor countries or organisations will be invited to join Partner Platforms for the Facility, to be established in each country. The Partner Platforms will meet quarterly (or on an as-needed basis) to review progress toward milestones of the national Facility workplan milestones, to assess results, and provide recommendations as to next steps and future direction (see Section 8.2.2).

It is envisaged that national Partner Platforms will meet following approval of Joint Action Plans, to track and guide the implementation process. Partner Platforms will include representation of the target communities themselves, to promote their voice and ownership.

UNDP will support LCBC to establish and service an International Support Group for Regional Strategy Implementation, building on the current composition and mandate of the Lake Chad Consultative Group of countries (Output 5.1)

The Facility will support establishment of the international Task Force for implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, under the purview of the UN Special Envoy for the Sahel and the Agency working groups of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel to ensure coherence and coordination of the proposed *New Way of Working* at regional, national and sub-national level.

III. Results & Partnerships

3.1 Result area 1 - Immediate stabilisation

The different conditions pertaining in each of the four Lake Chad countries, and indeed between States and Regions within countries, as well as the dynamic nature of the conflict, requires a staged approach to be taken to formulation of activities.

This Section details the outputs to be delivered and the outcomes to be achieved by the Facility, and the indicative activities to be implemented. These will be further detailed in the preparation of national 'windows' for the Facility, which will seek to customise the approach to the specific context in the affected States/Regions of the four countries, for approval by respective Government authorities.

Finally, the precise mix of activities necessary for immediate stabilisation of individual target areas will be determined during the preparation of the Joint Action Plans, which will be consolidated in each country into national Annual Work Plans for review and approval by the Partner Platforms envisaged.

3.1.1 Output 1 – Community safety and security improved

Improving physical security for the communities around Lake Chad is fundamental to re-building their trust in Government and a prerequisite for making other investments in infrastructure, services and livelihoods. Developing the humanitarian-development-peace nexus requires a highly context-specific approach. Notwithstanding the great variations in security conditions prevailing in the affected States and Regions, and the need to ensure that customised plans are made that respond to local perceptions as well as realities, people-centric, inclusive approaches to security need to be adopted. Local communities need to be supported to define their own security needs and be empowered, as much as possible, to address these themselves²¹.

Civil-military cooperation needs to be enhanced to develop sequenced and coordinated action plans that outline the key components, mobilise and regulate the contribution of the relevant actors, ensure capacities and resources are provided to them, and that timelines for implementation are established and respected.

Military authorities, national and/or MNJTF, will need to be closely involved in the planning process, to provide security while the presence and capacities of civilian security actors is enhanced, and to support key aspects of implementation, e.g., assessment and clearance of explosive ordnance contamination.

Ministries of Interior and police authorities at the State/Region level must be engaged to plan and implement increased law enforcement presence in communities – new officers will need to be recruited and deployed in timely fashion. There may be a need for new police stations, accommodation for officers, for training and for vehicles, communications and specialised equipment.

²¹ See conclusions recorded in the Outcome Document, Lake Chad Multi-Disciplinary Expert Meeting on Livelihoods and Water, The Hague, 18-19 February 2019.

In many places, trust in the police is limited, and needs to be built over time; often communities have more confidence in vigilante groups. Appropriate action needs to be taken to professionalise and regulate such actors, integrating their roles and responsibilities into transitional arrangements. Remuneration may be provided, and training given to build their capacities to enhance community security and to avoid causing harm to those they are charged to protect. Standard operating procedures should be defined, liaison and clear reporting arrangements with the military and civilian law enforcement actors established.

In every area, community engagement needs to be established or strengthened, on an inclusive, participatory, gender and age-balanced basis, to represent the community in decision-making on the design of the intervention, to guide its implementation on the ground, ensuring in particular that it meets the specific needs of women and girls, as well as the most vulnerable. Community engagement mechanisms will also have an important role to play in the establishment of a network of early warning and response systems, and the design and implementation of future interventions for return and reintegration of released or low-risk Boko Haram-associated persons.

An inclusive and participatory approach is understood as vital to address a number of human security priorities of the immediate stabilisation process. Communities themselves need to be mobilised to find culturally appropriate remedies to the prevalence of psycho-social trauma, the epidemic of sexual and gender-based violence in the region, and widespread drug abuse amongst the young, which is claiming many lives around Lake Chad and has become a key issue between generations. Armed opposition groups are thought to be involved in drug supply and tackling the issue through raised community awareness and a public health approach provides an opportunity to challenge terrorist financing as well as promote social cohesion.

As per Strategy Section 2.4.3, human rights violations by security providers are considered absolutely toxic to the overarching effort to rebuild the social contract, and to isolate and defeat the insurgency. Human rights defenders should be a visible and regular presence on the ground in every target area, to hear and record community grievances and to ensure that all security providers – military, police, vigilante groups – operate to the highest possible standards of behaviour in respect to the local population.

Activity 1.1 – Enhancing coordination on security at community level

The first priority of the Facility will be to support relevant authorities to establish a clear methodology in each State for the overall stabilisation process, and to establish the civil-military cooperation mechanism to ensure the functional coordination arrangements on security that will be needed to deliver stabilisation according to the specific needs pertaining in the different levels of target area.

Within the first quarter of Facility implementation, UNDP will sign agreements with the relevant civilian security providers²² in each country to formalise the cooperation necessary for re-establishing effective

²² Each country has a different composition of civilian security providers. Among these organisations are civil defence,

law enforcement presence in the target areas to be selected. Agreements will cover the roles and responsibilities of each security provider to recruit, train and equip, deploy and remunerate the necessary staff, and to ensure as far as possible gender balance and alignment with applicable gender strategies and good practice²³.

Agreements may cover Facility agreement to procure any vehicles, uniforms, communications and other non-lethal equipment that may be required, according to common specifications in each country. On the basis of the specifications established, UNDP will prequalify contractors to fulfil requirements of the Joint Action Plans to be developed for each target area (see Activity 1.3).

Activity 1.2 – Community engagement in each target area

Community engagement will be a priority from the outset. In each target area communities need to be involved, on an inclusive and participatory basis, to represent the community in decision-making on the design of the intervention and to guide its implementation on the ground, ensuring in particular that it meets the specific needs of women and girls, as well as other vulnerable groups

In addition to interviewing all households to establish Community Perceptions of Public Safety and Security, and to inform preparation of Local Conflict Analyses, the Facility will establish or strengthen the following types of community-based mechanisms:

Stabilisation Committees	<p>Stabilisation Committees are intended to ensure community engagement in the process of establishing public safety and security in each target area. They should seek to promote the active involvement of communities in reporting problems, a culture of looking out for fellow community members, and of alternative dispute resolution to prevent conflicts becoming violent²⁴</p> <p>The Stabilisation Committees will review the findings of the local Perception Studies on Public Safety and Security (see Activity 1.3), prepare Public Safety and Security Plans in response, and contribute to implementation/oversight of Facility sub-projects to work to be funded by the Facility from an unearmarked budget line reserved for this purpose.</p> <p>Via relevant local authorities, the Stabilisation Committees will feed into the work in regard to security coordination arrangements and contingency planning – see Activity 1.1); The Stabilisation Committee will also be able to refer issues to the reinforced Civil-Military Coordination mechanism (see Activity 1.4).</p> <p>Stabilisation Committees are intended as the primary mechanism for organising community consultations on infrastructure design and works, and definition of livelihood options. They will also have a key role to play in facilitating development of Joint Action Plans (see Activity 1.3), including completion of rapid appraisals and</p>
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ministries of interior, gendarmerie, police, immigration, and national security.

²³ In Nigeria, for instance, this will include establishment of gender desks/focal points in each police station, as per the Gender Policy of the Nigeria Police Force, November 2010.

²⁴ The Stabilisation Committee may work closely with the NSCDC Peace & Conflict Unit, separately supported by the Facility (see Activity 1.5).

	<p>preparing and/or validating household lists and identification of beneficiaries for livelihoods initiatives;</p> <p>Stabilisation Committees should be headed by local Government officials, and comprise representatives of all security providers, including vigilante groups. Community representatives should include community leaders and elders as well as representatives of local business, women’s groups and youth groups etc. Stabilisation Committees will be ‘retired’ at the end of the immediate stabilisation phase and their work subsumed in that of Development Committees to be established for ‘extended’ stabilisation under Output</p>
Peace Committees	<p>Peace Committees are intended to promote peaceful co-existence, resolve civil disputes through mediation and preserve communal relationships. They will be involved in community sensitisation and reconciliation processes to counter stigmatisation that leads some to re-join armed opposition groups and will support the return and reintegration of Boko Haram-associated persons as and when appropriate. They should be established as soon as possible under Facility intervention, although the effect and impact of Peace Committees is likely to be felt more over the longer term of extended stabilisation rather than during the immediate stabilisation phase. Given displacement of civilians and absence of civilian authorities from category 2 and 3 areas, identifying, mobilising and regularising long-term Peace Committee membership and engagement will be a process throughout the period of immediate stabilisation, and as a result of its work (eg, facilitation of returns, administrative and civilian law enforcement presence).</p>

Membership of all committees should comprise at least 50 percent women wherever possible, and also include representation of people routinely marginalised, such as people with disabilities and from minority religious and ethnic backgrounds. Committees should have strong youth representation. Members will be tasked with reflecting the concerns and sharing information with different constituencies, with particular focus on reaching those most marginalised. The committees will be set up and facilitated in ways to ensure meaningful participation of all members.

In some target areas, it is likely that one or more of the proposed committees will already exist in some form, supported by other projects or programmes. Wherever this is the case, the Facility will work with and build on what already exists rather than establishing new structures or mechanisms.

Activity 1.3 - Mapping the local situation

Community engagement will support development of the following two rapid assessment exercises to be undertaken in each target area:

- i) **Local Conflict Analysis.** The dynamics of the conflict, of the war economy that has developed in response to it, and the patterns of sexual and human rights abuses arising from both, vary significantly from location to location. It is essential that a local conflict analysis which integrates gender and social exclusion analyses is undertaken in each target area to ensure conflict sensitivity and a “do no harm” approach, and to identify the actors

and working methodology most likely to achieve success. LCAs will be prepared for each target area during the six-week period of JAP development, according to a contract to be developed during the Facility preparatory phase and awarded upon Facility launch.

- ii) **Community Perception Studies on Public Safety and Security.** As part of the process of interviewing all heads of households in the intended target areas (see Activity 3.2), a study will be conducted in relation to perceptions of physical safety and security, prevalence of drug abuse and crime, incidence of sexual and gender-based violence and other human rights abuses. Community views on potential measures to be taken to address the security situation will inform development of sub-projects to be prioritised by Stabilisation Committees under Activity 1.2, as well as quick impact projects to be organised under Civil-Military Coordination arrangements (see Activity 1.4 below).

Activity 1.4 - Civil-military coordination

Effective civil-military coordination is central to crisis response in region. Civil-Military Coordination engages three sets of actors:

- Humanitarian and development actors, represented by OCHA;
- State Ministries and civilian law enforcement Agencies;
- Military units, under the authority of national command or MNJTF.

The Facility will also support national military and the MNJTF to review and upgrade their capacity for Civil-Military Coordination. In order to more fully systematise Civil-Military Coordination into operations in around Lake Chad, the Facility will advocate for dedicated Civil-Military Coordination positions of appropriate rank. It may provide Civil-Military Coordination training for the military either directly, via UN DPO standing capacity, or through the bilateral assistance programmes of its key donor partners. The Facility will work under OCHA guidance to ensure that the Civil-Military Coordination framework is functioning successfully at all levels.

The Facility will reserve an unearmarked budget to support Civil-Military Coordination-identified Quick Impact Projects in the target areas, in order to overcome current issues relating to split responsibilities and lack of resources for perimeter security and other essential community security interventions, as well as to demonstrate the efficacy of improved Civil-Military Coordination arrangements. Quick win projects may be identified through the community perceptions studies on security to be undertaken, or by the Stabilisation Committees to be established.

Support will also be given to military authorities in the effective implementation of the code of conduct, rules of engagement and strengthened operation of the human rights desk in the operational areas (see Activity 1.8).

Activity 1.5 - Increasing law enforcement presence

The Facility will support transition from military operations to civilian law enforcement through the provision of resources to the police or other civilian Agencies necessary to expand or establish their presence and with the training, equipment, means of communication and transport necessary to fulfil the roles and responsibilities required of them. Subject to national and bilateral agreements to do so,

the Facility will also support Border Agencies with the necessary means to re-open closed Border Crossings while enhancing green and blue border control.

Civilian law enforcement Agencies are expected to provide the relevant number of trained officers for permanent deployment to each target area according to a schedule to be agreed in each Joint Action Plan, and Letters of Agreement to be signed with UNDP. The Letters will cover responsibility of each Ministry to train and equip, deploy and remunerate the necessary staff, and to ensure as far as possible gender balance and alignment with applicable gender strategies and good practice²⁵. The Facility will support pre-deployment training in and refresher programmes on human rights and international humanitarian law for personnel of security agencies (including the military – see Activity 1.8). It will also provide new or rebuilt police stations, furnished dormitory accommodation, vehicles, communications and other specialised equipment necessary to support the deployment. Advance procurement and pre-positioning of supplies may be undertaken to support timely and effective deployment.

Support will be provided to strengthen the internal accountability mechanisms of the security agencies (see Activity 1.8). All assistance to security providers under the Facility will be governed by the inter-Agency *Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces*.

Activity 1.6 - Community Contributions to Public Safety and Security

With the absence of effective safety and security at the community level, vigilante groups have in many places provided the link between the security agencies and communities, and the functions that vigilantes often perform – perimeter security, patrolling and static guard duties, intelligence gathering etc. – remain vital components of the community security architecture.

Vigilante groups are viewed as a potential threat to longer term state stability, however, if members are not demobilised and provided with sustainable civilian roles post-conflict or provided with alternative livelihood opportunities. While often trusted by communities more than formal security providers²⁶, there have been notable cases of vigilante involvement in extrajudicial killings, sexual harassment, exploitation, abuse and extortion²⁷.

²⁵ In Nigeria, for instance, this will include establishment of gender desks/focal points in each police station, as per the Gender Policy of the Nigeria Police Force, November 2010.

²⁶ In addition to calling for more security forces, better equipped and trained than at present, a clear finding of more than 100 focus group discussions held with over 1,100 people in the four insurgency-affected countries, was that more equipment and training should be given to vigilante groups, on which many communities rely for their security, seeing them as complementary to armed forces and formal security actors. UNDP Discussion Paper, *Perspectives from Local Communities on Stabilization and Building Peace in the Lake Chad Basin*, prepared for the first Lake Chad Governor's Forum, held in Maidaguri, Borno State, Nigeria, May 2018.

²⁷ Anecdotal evidence also suggests a high level of substance abuse.

The ultimate goal must be the demobilisation and disarmament of vigilante groups as stabilisation gains traction²⁸. The Facility will work with all States/Regions to develop long-term plans for the integration of vigilantes into formal security provision or their reintegration into civilian life.

Support will be provided only to vigilante groups already affiliated with and/or ready to work with, and for, existing and planned State security providers, and who demonstrably enjoy the support of their communities²⁹. Subject to formalisation as a regular security actor, members will be certified, remunerated, and may be issued with uniforms, vehicles, communications and other necessary non-lethal equipment; appropriate training will be provided. Membership will be restricted to those over 18 years of age. Where it is not happening already, UNDP will collaborate with UNICEF to ensure that children currently associated with vigilante groups will be de-linked and offered alternative livelihood options, including “catch-up” education classes (see Activity 3.3).

All members should be registered and interviewed to establish prospective livelihood pathways for future demobilisation; biometric data of individuals and the serial numbers of weapons should be recorded against theft or future misuse. The Facility will provide training of vigilante groups in civilian harm reduction and human rights in all target areas (see Activity 1.8).

Activity 1.7 - Addressing critical community security issues

An inclusive and participatory approach is understood as vital to address a number of human security priorities of the immediate stabilisation process. Communities themselves need to be mobilised to find culturally appropriate remedies to the prevalence of psycho-social trauma, the epidemic of sexual and gender-based violence in the region, and widespread drug abuse amongst the young, which is claiming many lives in northern Nigeria and has become a key issue between generations. Tackling the issue through raised community awareness and a public health approach provides an opportunity to promote social cohesion.

On the basis of needs identified in the community perception studies on security to be undertaken, priority interventions in all three areas will be formulated and implemented to address the issues as required, with the support of the Stabilisation Committees envisaged under Activity 1.2.

Wherever possible, all three interventions will be led by local CBOs and national NGOs, rather than international actors, in order to ensure culturally appropriate implementation and increase acceptance and engagement at community level.

Activity 1.8 - Promoting human rights and civilian protection in target areas

Human rights violations by security providers are considered absolutely toxic to the overarching effort to rebuild the social contract, and to isolate and defeat the insurgency. Human rights defenders should be a visible and regular presence on the ground in every target area, to hear and record community

²⁸ In Nigeria, UNDP will engage in this activity in more secure areas through a EU-funded joint Agency Programme with IOM and UNICEF.

²⁹ To be independently established by the Community Perception Studies on Public Safety and Security and the Local Conflict Analyses (see Activity 1.3), and via the Human Rights Baseline Survey (see Activity 1.8).

grievances and to ensure that all security providers – military, police, vigilante groups – operate to the highest possible standards of behaviour in respect to the local population.

Well-functioning human rights monitoring and accountability mechanisms around Lake Chad are a key priority of the intervention. The Facility will work in close collaboration with the UN OHCHR at regional level and in each country according to presence

The Facility Peace Committees to be established will be integrated into target area security arrangements to be proposed, to ensure regular feedback in regard to tensions or abuses felt at community level.

Civil society human rights organisations in each country will be supported to establish regular operation presence in the target areas, and to undertake ongoing monitoring and quarterly reporting detailing individual incidents and summarising the human rights situation in general. Monitoring reports are intended both to act as early warning and to document violations and atrocities. The information can be used to later show if a determination of war crimes or crimes against humanity can be made before it is too late to respond.

Reports will be shared with partners on implementation of the Joint Action Plans and will be available to the Partner Platform in each country. Reports will also be available via the LCBC Knowledge Management Platform at regional level³⁰.

Facility activities will be developed to:

- Strengthen the framework for effective and systematic monitoring and reporting on human rights linked to accountability, including support to internal accountability mechanisms of security agencies to ensure that they are operational and effective; support to military authorities in the effective implementation of the code of conduct, rules of engagement and strengthened operation of the human rights desk in the operational areas;
- Support to the engagement of all Lake Chad countries with international human rights mechanisms to enhance realisation of human rights in the operational area;
- Advise and train on human rights and civilian protection, including development of tools and manuals for security agencies, law enforcement officials and other practitioners on the implementation of international standards this will also include:
 - The development of a legal framework and codes of conduct for all security agencies operational around Lake Chad;

³⁰ The Regional 'window' of the Regional Stabilisation Facility will build capacities of LCBC through NANHRI (the Network of African National Human Rights Institutions), regional partner of GANHRI (the Global alliance of National Human Rights Institutions). UNDP works in a tripartite partnership on Human Rights with GANHRI and UNOHCHR.

- o Design and establish a mechanism and forum for pre-deployment training and refresher programmes on human rights, international humanitarian law and civilian protection during operations for personnel of all security agencies.

3.1.2 Output 2 - Essential infrastructure & basic services functioning

Essential infrastructure will be built or repaired, and basic services provided, to establish liveable conditions in insurgency-affected areas.

Infrastructure needs fall into a number of categories:

- Public infrastructure for the delivery of essential education, WASH (water, sanitation, hygiene) and health services, as well as electricity and water supplies, community centres, women’s safe spaces etc;
- Economic infrastructure such as mobile masts, local roads, bridges and border crossing points, marketplaces, warehouses, silos etc; vocational training centres, boreholes and irrigation channels for agricultural communities, *aire-de-repose*, vaccination pens, boreholes and water points for pastoralists;
- Infrastructure for mobile networks;
- Damaged or destroyed private homes, as well as dormitory accommodation for use by police and civil servants in remote areas, school and vocational training students; and
- Municipal administrative buildings, such as town halls, police stations, reception centres for screening of Boko Haram-associated persons, etc.

In Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, UNDP will identify and pre-qualify building contractors from the affected States/Regions within two months of Facility launch (in Niger, in line with previous successful UNDP interventions, army engineers will design as well as build/rehabilitate infrastructure as required in the four target communes). Contractors will be pre-qualified to provide 1) overall design, preparation of bills of quantity & primary-level supervision; 2) construction/rehabilitation works; 3) secondary-level supervision/monitoring where access is restricted for UN staff (otherwise to be carried out by UNDP Engineers directly).

Target areas will be subject to a number of preparatory steps to inform infrastructure development and planning:

1. Assessment of EO contamination by relevant authorities;
2. GIS mapping of the local area to establish current situation and baselines against which progress will be measured;
3. Rapid environmental assessments to ensure the sustainability of the settlement for human habitation and agriculture, to identify climate risk mitigation measures and renewable energy options to accompany Facility infrastructure investment;
4. Consultations with and through Stabilisation Committees or similar structures to ensure community identification of priorities and understanding of proposed processes and timelines; and
5. Beneficiary household interviews to determine housing needs (Activity 3.2) and provide data for planning of public services.

Once national authorities have selected the target areas and communities to benefit from the Facility, UNDP Engineers will work with relevant local Government officials to identify priority infrastructure for rehabilitation or construction under each Joint Action Plan.

Interventions for provision of basic services will be identified and coordinated with Governors and UN Agencies with specific mandates (UNICEF for schools, WHO for health centres etc.), and local communities. All projects will be subject to Government agreement to mobilise and maintain the necessary civil servants, ensure minimum necessary equipment (i.e. for provision of health treatment, desks, school books, etc.), and commit to the recurrent costs of continued maintenance and delivery of the services (e.g. payment of supplies and salaries of teachers and health care workers) according to the timetable to be established by each Joint Action Plan.

UNDP will provide a minimum of capacity development and operational support to local Government to ensure the smooth running of newly restarted or extended public services. Support may include on-the-job training and/or provision of necessary minor equipment as necessary.

Activity 2.1 - GIS mapping of target areas

Following initial selection of target areas by national authorities, GIS mapping will be utilised to capture the pre-intervention situation, establishing a local damage and needs assessment to inform infrastructure package design process. GIS mapping (and reporting) will be organised by the Facility on a regional basis, to be provided as a service to each national team.

Activity 2.2 - Explosive ordnance contamination assessment and clearance

Target areas should be subject to technical assessment of contamination by mines, IEDs and other explosive war materiel, and type and difficulty of clearance operations required. The level of contamination should be one criterion of the target area selection process: for the purposes of this Facility, in which the need to move quickly is seen as critical to achieve the results required, any EOD contamination must be relatively light, with relevant units able to conduct clearance operations within the six-week period given for infrastructure design and preparation of bills of quantity (Activity 2.7). Areas with heavy EOD contamination, requiring extensive clearance operations, will not be considered for selection under this first phase of the Facility.

Activity 2.3 - Preparation of Joint Action Plans, infrastructure and services component

In collaboration with State authorities, UNDP will develop a costed and timebound infrastructure and services component for the Joint Action Plan, detailing construction works to be undertaken and services to be provided.

Letters of Agreement will be annexed to the Joint Action Plan will outline the roles and responsibilities of each party to include Government agreement to take responsibility for the future maintenance of infrastructure built or repaired, its commitment to recruit and remunerate the civil servants required to provide services, and the equipment and training they will need to do so.

Once the Joint Action Plan is approved by the national Partner Platform a press release will be prepared, and plans will be announced to the general public as part of the overall strategic communications work of the Facility and LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy.

Activity 2.4 - Infrastructure design & preparation of BoQs

Facility Engineers and/or prequalified contractors will design the required infrastructure and prepare necessary bills of quantities (BoQ) within six weeks of the date of Joint Action Plan approval.

In line with the principles of Section 2.5.3 above, rapid environmental assessment will be undertaken to recommend climate change mitigation measures that can inform the location and design of infrastructure, wells, irrigation systems, tree planting schemes etc, as well as to identify and plan renewable energy options.

Infrastructure design will include options for “build-back-better” such as the provision of renewable energy to communities, to provide light and power for the purposes of community security, entertainment, communication, cooking, pumping of water, and running of education and health facilities, and other public buildings.

Activity 2.5 - Construction works

Construction works will be undertaken by private sector local contractors in all countries except Niger, where military engineering units will be engaged as per existing methodology (see above, Activity 2.1). Primary-level supervision of works will be conducted by local authorities/contracting company. Secondary-level supervision will be conducted directly UNDP Engineers wherever the security situation allows access for UN staff.

Independent third-party monitoring will be organised to ensure delivery and quality of civil works. In addition, a broader set of monitoring activities will be undertaken directly by UNDP staff or by third-party contractors. This will include continuous GIS mapping and community feedback on the implementation and impact of the overall Joint Action Plan. Results will be shared with Partner Platforms on an ongoing basis.

Following completion of construction works and delivery of agreed equipment, a handover event will be organised for Government authorities to officially open facilities and launch public services for the community, in line with the principles of the visibility & communications strategy outlined in Section 2.4.4.

All construction works will be carried out with appropriate waste-management regulations in mind. The contractors will be assessed on their ability to ensure waste generated by construction is disposed of in a manner that is in line with national and international regulations of construction waste management.

Activity 2.6 - Provision of equipment & capacity development support

In parallel with the construction works phase, UNDP will organise competitive tender processes for the provision of equipment and other supplies necessary to the provision of basic services, as per Letters of Agreement (LoAs) to be agreed between UNDP and national authorities as part of the Joint Action Plans.

In addition, UNDP will provide capacity development support to ensure that systems are in place, and relevant local Government staff trained, to the minimum level necessary to ensure immediate effective functioning of services and utilities for community benefit.

3.1.3 Output 3 - Livelihood opportunities available

The conflict has led to severe restrictions in freedom of movement affecting a great deal of economic activity, including, *inter alia*, the use of motor taxis, the trade in certain types of food and fuel, access agricultural land to some fishing areas of Lake Chad, and the operation of markets in more remote villages and towns. Commerce-related infrastructure has been destroyed and the closure of borders to cross-border trade have further constrained local economies and livelihoods while driving up the cost of basic commodities.

According to the REACH multi-sector needs assessment of northern Nigeria in 2018, almost half the population is borrowing money to buy food (Borno 43%, Adamawa 46%, Yobe 44%). Across the region, various studies point to women and girls forced into survival sex in order to sustain their families. It is considered essential to make target areas 'liveable' once again through emergency employment and support to other income-generating activities.

Although the rise of armed opposition groups cannot be reduced to the issue of poor socio-economic conditions alone, or to the counter-insurgency measures that have exacerbated them, it was and is an important factor that fuels active recruitment to, and passive complicity with, the continued operations of armed opposition groups. Addressing issues of poor livelihoods and food security remains central to both the prevention of violent extremism as well as the overall stabilisation and recovery effort.

The intention of the Facility is to ensure that one or more members of every household in the selected target areas is able to benefit from at least one of a mix of possible livelihood opportunities.

For the most part, the sort of opportunities to be offered will replicate those already run successfully by UNDP and other actors elsewhere – the point is to offer them in the same place, at the same time, as part of the broader package of assistance that includes activities in support of security and the rule of law, and activities to construct essential infrastructure and establish basic service provision. The purpose of the intervention is threefold:

1. To ensure people have income opportunities to sustain their living in the target area, without getting into a cycle of desperation and debt;
2. To offer productive activity and a little hope in future economic prospects, as an alternative to the recruitment incentives of armed opposition groups³¹;
3. To provide a short-term fiscal stimulus to the local economy while longer-term economic development interventions have time to demonstrate results at scale.

³¹ 70% of respondents of the UNDP Perception Studies in north-east Nigeria considered poverty and idleness to be the greatest form of insecurity that they face. Just over 50% of respondents identified material gain as the single largest factor incentivising engagement with armed opposition groups.

Once target area selection is completed, UNDP will work with local authorities, traditional and religious leaders, and with community representatives in the target area and in IDP camps, to launch a rapid assessment exercise to profile the community and establish the number and composition of households.

Local CSOs/NGOs will be contracted to interview household members between the ages of 14 and 35 according to a simple mobile app questionnaire, to establish existing skills, future interests and current availability to participate in one of the livelihood options.

All options envisaged are in line with the UNDP's Guide for Livelihoods and Economic Recovery in (post) crisis contexts and based on the UN Policy on Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration.

The likely mix of activities will include, but not necessarily be restricted to:

1. Paid employment in support of enhanced security and the rule of law, either with law enforcement agencies or with vigilante groups whose activities are to be formalised and regulated (see Activity 1.6);
2. Paid employment with contractors responsible for rehabilitation/construction of infrastructure (Activity 2.5) or with self-help CSOs/NGOs contracted by the Facility for other initiatives;
3. Cash-for-Work schemes, to include, *inter alia*, work brigades for rubble removal, environmental clean-up and climate change mitigation, rural road repair, painting of public buildings etc. Schemes can be proposed and agreed with communities themselves, and will be deemed eligible on the basis of a ratio of 70% labour costs to 30% materials/equipment;
4. Emergency asset replacement schemes, to include, *inter alia*, minor equipment for small businesses, small grants for traders to buy stock; hand tools and seeds for farmers, nets/boats for fishers etc.;
5. Vocational training, to include, *inter alia*, agricultural production, bookkeeping and stock management for traders, IT and mobile phone repair, tailoring, hairdressing, shoe making, catering, aluminium and fabrication of construction products, car mechanics etc, renewable energy installation and maintenance, via establishment of satellite classrooms of existing VET centres;
6. The UNDP 3x6 approach will be utilised to support new start-up businesses, offering pathways for cash-for-work beneficiaries to access vocational training and benefit from business grants for approved cooperative ventures³²;

³² The UNDP 3x6 approach began in Burundi and is being successfully implemented in a number of contexts globally: http://earlyrecovery.global/sites/default/files/3x6_toolkit_building_resilience_through_jobs_and_livelihoods.pdf

7. Attendance allowance for 14-18 years olds participating in “catch-up” education classes that will be organised while secondary schooling is re-established, and which will use functional literacy techniques to promote citizenship and peaceful co-existence and reinforce Facility work on human security issues in the community, e.g., trauma, drug abuse and SGBV;
8. Unconditional cash transfers to households caring for the most vulnerable: psychologically traumatised or otherwise mentally impaired people; physically disabled persons unable to look after themselves. In addition to ensuring that “no-one is left behind”, this initiative should be utilised to build community confidence in Government attempts to renew the social contract, linking to longer-term efforts to establish social protection systems.

Activity 3.1 - Establishment of livelihood options for each target area

Following selection of target areas by national authorities, UNDP, based on opportunity mapping assessments, will work with all relevant stakeholders to prepare a mix of potential livelihood options for households in the beneficiary communities, and identify the public sector, private sector and CSO/NGO partners best placed to deliver them.

UNDP plans will be prepared with, and validated by, the community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures to be established, for inclusion in the Joint Action Plans to be developed.

Activity 3.2 - Identification of households and beneficiaries

Following approval of the Joint Action Plans by the Partner Platforms (see Activity 3.5), local CSOs/NGOs will be contracted to map all households in the target communities, to establish current status and composition. Information will be drawn from local authorities, traditional rules and religious leaders, and will cover those in IDP camps as well as the resident population. Peace committees or similar structures may be utilised to cross-reference and validate data collected.

All beneficiary candidates will be interviewed as to current employment status and livelihood preferences vis-à-vis the mix of options established by the Joint Action Plans. Beneficiary lists for each option will be established, with a view to ensuring that every household has at least one member benefiting from one of the available options.

Activity 3.3 - Contracting livelihood option providers

UNDP will procure livelihood option providers through a mixture of competitive processes and direct contracting modalities, according to its applicable rules and regulations, depending on the option concerned and the legal status of the provider – Government, Agency or CSO/NGO, private sector etc.

Activity 3.4 - Provision of livelihood opportunities

CSOs/NGOs will be contracted to collect biometric data from all potential beneficiaries. Beneficiaries without valid ID cards will be assisted to get them. Free SIM cards will be distributed to each beneficiary, to facilitate payments to be made via mobile providers.

Special attention will be paid to ensure the provision of sufficient and appropriate livelihood options for women. Women-only cash-for-work brigades may be considered.

It is anticipated that the different livelihood options will become available for beneficiaries on a staged basis from months 9-12 of Facility implementation.

3.2 Result area 2 – Extended stabilisation

The development of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy in 2018, with support of the African Union, is understood as a significant step forward in regional and continental ownership of the crisis, and as a solid foundation for the cross-border cooperation and coordination required to address it. As per the Strategy section above, lessons learned from UNDP experience in Iraq and elsewhere include the need to differentiate activities of ‘immediate’ and ‘extended’ stabilisation, to ensure that the latter is initiated in parallel with implementation of the former, and that both are fully ‘owned’ by relevant authorities.

The Regional Stabilisation Strategy proposes the necessary mechanisms and processes to establish a coherent and coordinated approach to ‘extended’ stabilisation. It can only be implemented, however, if LCBC has the capacity to fulfil its foreseen role. Resources are required to support the cross-border cooperation and coordination mechanisms envisaged by the Strategy, and an operational structure is needed in the affected States/Regions to ensure that the Strategy is localised as the overarching framework for a multi-partner intervention that specifically plans and implements a move from the provision of humanitarian assistance to early recovery and sustainable development.

3.2.1 Output 4 - Enhanced capacities of LCBC to implement the RSS

As per provisions of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy³³, the LCBC Secretariat should fulfil the following roles and responsibilities in support of RSS implementation:

- Servicing of the Steering Committee for Strategy Implementation;
- Support to regional-level civil-military coordination;
- Facilitation of cross-border cooperation mechanisms, including the Lake Chad Governor’s Forum, a Regional Civil Society Platform and other standing or *ad hoc* cross-border dialogue initiatives;
- Establishment of Strategy monitoring & evaluation framework, and annual reporting;
- Ongoing mapping of all completed, ongoing and proposed initiatives of the Strategy, development and maintenance of Strategy Results & Resources framework, regional donor liaison and coordination [including aid tracking]³⁴;
- Research and knowledge management; and
- Regional communications work.

In order to enhance LCBC capacities and achieve the desired result, the Facility will engage in three sets of activities:

³³ LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, page 42

³⁴ At the request of the key donors following the Oslo II Conference on Lake Chad, held in Berlin 2-4th September 2018

1. Direct funding of staff to work for a new Stabilisation Secretariat within LCBC;
2. Provision of technical advisory support in a number of fields;
3. A sub-project to build LCBC financial and administrative capacities to international standard.

Activity 4.1 - Establishing the LCBC Stabilisation Secretariat

The Facility will support LCBC to establish a Stabilisation Secretariat, as envisaged in the Regional Stabilisation Strategy (RSS). UNDP will support LCBC with funding for the creation of the following posts for the RSS Secretariat in line with UNDP rules and as agreed with LCBC:

- **Head of Stabilisation** - The LCBC Head of Stabilisation will be recruited and seconded to the LCBC to Coordinate the operationalisation and implementation of the RSS. The Head of Stabilisation will report directly to the Executive Secretary (ES) of LCBC and will support the ES with representation, partnerships and resource mobilisation, and with political cooperation for Strategy implementation in the four affected LCB countries, with Regional Economic Commissions, and with international partners. He/she will be the main point of contact with the UNDP and AU teams providing capacity development and technical assistance to LCBC in support of the Stabilisation Strategy. The Head of Stabilisation will serve as Secretary of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy and will oversee the work of all Stabilisation Secretariat staff.
- **Regional CIMIC Adviser** - The LCBC Regional CIMIC Adviser will act as civilian counterpart to MNJTF CIMIC colleagues and will maintain permanent liaison with Facility CIMIC Advisers in each of the four countries. The Regional CIMIC Adviser will have a particular focus on planning, sequencing and coordinating initiatives for extending humanitarian access in border areas, for the safe cross-border return of refugees, and for the secure opening of borders in support of human mobility and cross-border trade, following bilateral Government agreements to do so. He/she will also have responsibility for promoting civilian protection and human rights monitoring and accountability dimensions of the Strategy, collaborating closely with OHCHR on the regional level, and linking LCBC work on these issues to NANHRI (the Network of African National Human Rights Institutions), regional partner of GANHRI (the Global alliance of National Human Rights Institutions)³⁵.
- **Programme Specialist** - The LCBC Programme Specialist will be responsible for ensuring coherence and consistency in preparation of the TAPs in each of the eight target States/Regions and will further ensure the cross-border regional dimensions of the consolidated Strategy. The Programme Specialist will work closely with State-level authorities and with the UNDP team working on TAPs preparation and will take a lead role in preparation and follow-up of regional events for coordination and consultation (Governor's Forum, Civil Society Forum, Investment

³⁵ UNDP works in a tripartite partnership on Human Rights with GANHRI and UNOHCHR globally.

Forum etc.), and will work in conjunction with the M&E Specialist to ensure detailed annual reporting on RSS implementation progress.

- **M&E Specialist** - The LCBC M&E Specialist will establish the Results framework for the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, will propose and manage the LCBC M&E regime to follow Strategy implementation, will prepare Annual Reports to share Strategy progress, and will have responsibility for knowledge management in regard to the RSS. The M&E Specialist will take the lead in establishing the RSS Task Force that will define results to be achieved, and the New Way of Working proposed to achieve them.
- **Partnership and Resource Mobilisation Specialist** – The LCBC RSS Partnership and Resource Mobilisation Specialist will be responsible for developing and ensuring strong partnership with donors and development partners in the Lake Chad Basin Region, ensure regular interaction, update and communications with the donors and development partners, work closely with other specialists to identify additional resource needs and work closely with partners to support LCBC RSS Secretariat activities. The Specialist also develop a Joint Resource Mobilisation and Partnership Strategy for the LCBC RSS Secretariat, analyse the external and internal development environment, identify potential areas where the LCBC RSS is best positioned to succeed in resource mobilisation considering its regional outlook and its link with the national ‘windows’, and build capacity of other LCBC staff in partnership and resource mobilisation.

Support staff of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy Secretariat will also include a Communications Specialist, an ICT expert, an admin/finance assistant and driver.

Due to space constraints within the current LCBC premises, the Facility will part-fund construction of a new office in N’djamena, to accommodate both the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy Secretariat, and UNDP Stabilisation Facility staff. The Facility will cover the cost of office equipment and office maintenance.

Activity 4.2 - Providing technical advisory support to LCBC for RSS implementation

UNDP will work in partnership with the African Union to provide technical advisory services to the LCBC Stabilisation Secretariat, in a number of areas where coordinated work of UNDP Country Offices and HQ experience can add value or operational capacity: development of a coordination matrix of relevant interventions in the region, with tracking of donor pledges made at the Oslo II Conference, and with knowledge management, reporting and strategic communications.

A Knowledge Management Platform (KMP) will be designed, developed and launched online by UNDP. The purpose and structure of the KMP is outlined in more detail in Section 3.8 below. A dedicated national UNV will be recruited to ensure rolling provision of new content. The Facility will pay web-hosting fees to an internet provider for the KMP site and will sign a sub- contract with an external IT company to provide technical maintenance services for the duration of the Project. Ownership of the KMP, including liability for future costs involved with content provision, web-hosting and technical maintenance, will be transferred to LCBC upon closure of the Facility.

UNDP will support the proposed LCBC Stabilisation Secretariat with annual reporting on progress of implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, in regard to its own activities and those of other implementing actors in the eight insurgency-affected States or Regions. The RSS Programme Specialist will work with UNDP Facility staff to identify specific needs of the RSS on annual reporting and liaise with UNDP ensure that support required is accessed from UNDP.

The African Union is supporting LCBC to develop a Strategic Communications Plan for the Regional Stabilisation Strategy. In fulfilment of the Plan to be developed, the Facility will deliver communications work to be carried out in each country. The LCBC RSS Secretariat Communications Specialist will work closely and in collaboration with African Union and UNDP to deliver regional communication requirements.

Activity 4.3 - Providing operational and administrative management capacity support to LCBC

The Facility will work to build the capacities of LCBC to become a future implementing agency in its own right. A sub-project will be prepared for approval by the Regional Partner Platform, based on a detailed capacity assessment of existing LCBC systems and operations support structure. The expected result of the sub-project will be to develop the administrative and financial management capacities of LCBC to ensure business process and accountability of funds to international standard.

3.2.2 Output 5 - Improved cross-border cooperation and coordination

In support of implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, the Facility will fund three set of activities in regard to:

1. Coordination and partnership structures;
2. Regional and cross-border cooperation and consultation mechanisms;
3. A Task Force of Implementing Partners to operationalise the *New Way of Working*

Activity 5.1 - Facilitation of regional strategy steering committee and International Support Group

The Strategy Steering Committee, reporting to the LCBC Executive Secretary and Council of Ministers drawn from the Member States, will oversee all mechanisms, ensuring national and regional ownership and permanent liaison with African Union structures. It is intended that the existing Oslo Consultative Group of international partners will be expanded to form an International Support Group to support Strategy implementation, to meet annually in parallel with meetings of the RSS Steering Committee.

The Facility will provide logistical support to LCBC and the AUC in organisation of the RSS Steering Committee on an annual basis, to rotate between the four affected countries. UNDP will also continue its HQ-led support to the Oslo Consultative Group, and to the establishment of the proposed RSS International Support Group which may build upon it.

Activity 5.2 - Providing support to RSS cross-border consultation and coordination mechanisms

Under the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, a joint LCBC-MNJTF Civil Military Cooperation Cell will be established, with a particular focus on planning, sequencing and coordinating initiatives for the safe

cross-border return of refugees, and for the secure opening of borders in support of human mobility and cross-border trade, following bilateral Government agreements to do so.

The Governor's Forum, bringing together Governors of the eight insurgency-affected States or Regions included in the Facility, will promote and coordinate substantive cross-border interventions, supported by a technical Secretariat based within LCBC providing dedicated follow-up. The LCBC regional inter-parliamentary committee will promote the need for enhanced cross-border cooperation within national legislatures. A Regional Civil Society Forum and a Private Sector Investment Forum are envisaged to meet annually, mobilising non-Governmental actors to foster and enhance cross-border cooperation of stabilisation efforts in the four Lake Chad countries.

With support of the AUC, LCBC will convene a Conference for Regional Economic Commissions with geographical mandates for the Lake Chad region, to endorse the Regional Stabilisation Strategy and explore options for REC support to its provisions. The RSS further notes the likely need for additional, *ad hoc* cross-border cooperation events or processes to address emerging challenges or opportunities during the 5-year course of Strategy implementation.

The Facility will provide financial and logistical support to those mechanisms, processes and events and foreseen in the RSS, not presently funded by the Governments of Sweden and Germany under existing initiatives.

Activity 5.3 - Establishment of RSS implementation task force

The Facility will support LCBC and AUC participation in regional-level meetings aimed at establishing and maintaining the Regional Stabilisation Strategy Implementation Task Force, will fund consultancies as required to draft the Results Framework for the nine work pillars of the Regional Strategy, as well as guidelines to operationalise the *New Way of Working* within the implementation arrangements of the TAPs for the eight States/Regions³⁶.

3.2.3 Output 6 – State and Region Territorial Action Plans developed

In order to deliver the Territorial Action Plans that comprise the framework for implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, the Facility will engage in the following three activities:

1. Support to National-level coordination
2. Preparation of eight Territorial Action Plans, one for each affected State or Region
3. Sub-national coordination in each of the affected States or Regions

Activity 6.1 - Supporting national-level coordination

According to the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) for each of the eight affected States or Regions will be prepared under the authority, coordination and guidance of the national Governments, through a devolved mechanism that allows Governors' to provide direct

³⁶ LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, page 44

oversight and guidance. The Facility will service three coordination mechanisms at national level in each of the four beneficiary countries.

LCBC is requesting the four Governments to establish or delegate an existing inter-Ministerial coordination body to support implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy. Governors of the target States and Regions will liaise with the inter-Ministerial bodies to ensure coordination of responsibilities and interventions under national and sub-national competence.

The Facility will work with and through UN Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams to ensure system coherence and coordination, and the application of Strategy Task Force guidelines and initiatives, in each country. UNDP will take a portfolio management approach to coordinate the work of the Facility with its other interventions in favour of early recovery, peacebuilding and reconciliation, rehabilitation and reintegration of persons associated with armed opposition groups, the prevention of violent extremism, etc.

The Facility will establish partner platforms in each country, comprising contributing donors and other interested international stakeholders considered key to overall stabilisation of the affected areas. The partner platforms will ensure technical-level coordination of international support and will allow donor representatives a voice in the planning and roll-out of Facility activities (see Chapter 8).

Activity 6.2 - Preparation of eight State and Region Territorial Action Plans

The Facility will fund development of LCBC design guidelines to harmonise preparation of the TAPs in all eight States/Regions, and support State/Region-level administrations to undertake them.

The TAPs will build upon research, data and analysis already available, as well as results and lessons learnt from the JAPs, and will align with existing area-based development plans at LGA/Commune, or State/Region level, as well as take account of national sectoral development plans and programmes. In order to achieve a high level of public ownership, an inclusive approach must be taken which actively seeks to engage all sections of civil society, including local communities, traditional leaders, NGOs and CBOs, the media, academic institutions and the private sector. It is considered particularly important to capture adequately the voices of women and youth.

Development Committees will replace Stabilisation Committees as the primary mechanism for community engagement in Facility target areas, in support of 'extended' stabilisation and the process of territorial action planning foreseen by the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy. The Development Committees will have a role in supporting formulation and implementation of parallel initiatives for early recovery and development. Like Stabilisation Committees, the Development Committees should be chaired by local authorities and have a similarly inclusive membership, with gender-balance and a focus on youth.

The TAPs will be developed with inputs from inclusive and participatory for across each State and Region, including the Facility Development Committees to be established. Preparation of TAPs will be organised by the national chapters of the Task Force working groups, in order to operationalise the guidelines developed at regional level (Activity 2.3). Each of the TAPs will be subject to a common monitoring and evaluation framework to be established by LCBC, allowing baseline data to be pooled

and combined, common indicators to be developed, and a consolidated reporting regime to be established.

Activity 6.3 - Territorial coordination in all insurgency-affected States and Regions


The Facility will support two coordination activities at sub-national level, in each of the eight affected States or Regions.

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Advisers will ensure permanent liaison with military forces (MNJTF and national armies) and with civilian law enforcement agencies (police, immigration services, Customs etc.), in order to properly sequence and coordinate Facility activities and extend access for humanitarian actors wherever possible. CIMIC Advisers will also work in close coordination with UN DSS representatives in each country to ensure the safety and security of Facility staff.

The Stabilisation Facility will establish a coordination secretariat to support Governors to establish or strengthen existing coordination mechanisms in the eight insurgency-affected States/Regions, to operationalise the work of the Regional Strategy Implementation Task Force at local level and to ensure effective coordination of design and implementation of the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) to be developed.

The Facility will provide State authorities with mapping, coordination, M&E, and reporting capacity, linking directly with the same regional level work undertaken by the LCBC Stabilisation Secretariat, and with inter-Ministerial coordination bodies responsible for national support to the Regional Strategy (Activity 3.1).

Figure 3—Logical Framework Diagram of the Facility



3.3 Resources required to achieve the expected results

Output 1 - Contracts for vehicles, uniforms, training, communications and other non-lethal equipment for law enforcement agencies and community security providers; remuneration of community security providers; costs of meetings and events for Peace Committees and other consultation forums including per diem and travel expenses for officials and other participants; contracts for local conflict analyses and Community Security Perception Studies; project costs for QIPs and human security interventions; contracts for human rights monitoring and reporting, accountability mechanisms; budgets for strategic communications and knowledge management; proportion of UNDP staff salaries and related expenses, vehicles and office equipment, vehicle and office running costs; internal monitoring, direct project costs for UNDP Country Offices and project assurance by UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa (RSCA).

Output 2 - Costs for community consultations, including per diem and travel expenses for officials and other participants Contract(s) for GIS mapping, climate change fragility assessments, Contracts for design, works, primary and secondary-level supervision; capacity development support including equipment provision for resumption of basic services/renewable energy; costs of internal and third-party monitoring, Government visibility and strategic communications; proportion of UNDP staff salaries and related expenses, vehicles and office equipment, vehicle and office running costs; internal monitoring, direct project costs for UNDP Country Offices and project assurance.

Output 3 - Wages for cash-for-work participants; minor equipment and small grants for asset replacement; contracts with vocational training providers; new business grants under 3x6 Savings scheme; catch-up education attendance allowances; unconditional cash transfers for the most vulnerable; proportion of UNDP staff salaries and related expenses, vehicles and office equipment, vehicle and office running costs; internal monitoring, direct project costs for UNDP Country Offices and project assurance.

Output 4 - Salaries, per diem expenses and travel costs for LCBC staff; consultancy budget for provision of technical assistance to LCBC; per diem expenses and travel costs for AUC participation in Regional Stabilisation Strategy processes and events; salaries and related expenses for UNDP capacity development staff, vehicle, office equipment and vehicle/office running costs; direct project costs for UNDP Chad and project assurance by UNDP RSCA.

Output 5 - Costs for meetings and events for Regional Strategy coordination and consultation, Implementation Task Force, including per diem and travel expenses for officials and other participants; monitoring and project assurance.

Output 6 - Costs for meetings and events for national and State-level coordination of Regional Strategy implementation, and for preparation of State-level TAPs, including per diem and travel expenses for officials and other participants; consultancy costs for development of TAP guidelines & M&E framework; direct project costs for UNDP Country Offices, internal Facility monitoring and project assurance.

3.4 Partnerships

The key partners to implementation of the Facility, and the roles and responsibilities of each, are outlined in Section 2.5 above. They include:

- Local communities as stakeholders;
- Government authorities, both civilian and military, as counterparts;
- Regional and continental institutions, such as LCBC, relevant Regional Economic Commissions, and the African Union;
- UN Agencies and other implementing actors for coordination purposes;
- International partners for guidance and funding.

3.4.1 The Framework for UN intervention

The Facility will be implemented under the umbrella framework of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS). The UN Security Council adopted the UNISS in 2013³⁷, with the goal of reducing the socio-economic vulnerability of populations in 10 Sahel countries, including the four countries of the Lake Chad littoral. In 2017, a UN Support Plan for the Sahel was agreed to recalibrate the UNISS and accelerate efforts toward its implementation, under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary-General.

The UN Support Plan for the Sahel, which covers the period 2018-2030, serves as a vehicle for articulating and operationalizing the commitments of the UN system in the region. It builds on the progress achieved by UNISS to date, while re-aligning its focus with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the core priorities of national and regional partners for addressing current multifaceted challenges to peace, security and development in the region.

Through the Support Plan, the UN commits to bringing greater coordination and coherence in the implementation of national and regional initiatives, achieving quick and efficient results, and to providing a platform to mobilise further resources for the region and monitor progress. The Support Plan also represents a commitment to a new way of working in the region through better integration of its political, security, humanitarian and development efforts; a stronger focus on inter-agency programming and pooling of technical and a scaling up of regional and cross-border interventions.

An updated version of the UN Strategy on Boko Haram of September 2016 was approved by the Secretary General in April 2017. Following the Secretary-General's Executive Committee decision 4 (a) (2017/29) of 23rd February 2017, a Core Group of the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) on Boko Haram was established, comprising the Department for Political Affairs (DPA), UNDP, OCHA and UNOHCHR, to further integrate UN efforts across the region, and help guide/lead implementation of the strategy.

Under the strategy, the UN provides technical support to the regional Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) through the African Union (AU). A joint AU-LCBC-MNJTF Steering Committee was inaugurated on 14th November 2016, to strengthen coordination and information-sharing. One of the key objectives

³⁷ Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2056 (2012).

of the humanitarian response pillar of the updated UN Strategy remains enhancing access to humanitarian assistance, including through civil-military coordination and logistics.

3.4.2 UNDP work at regional and national Level

At the request of LCBC and the AU, UNDP has provided technical and financial support to the process of preparation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy and helped establish and service the Governor's Forum for Lake Chad. LCBC has further requested assistance from UNDP outlined in this document to support the key Inception Phase activities of the Strategy, and to build its organisational capacities to manage implementation of the Strategy as a whole.

UNDP's regional programme portfolio comprises three major interventions: an ongoing German Government initiative, *Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin*; a Swedish Government project, *"Winning the Peace"*, which funded the consultative process and drafting of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy; Dutch Government support to the Lake Chad component of the UNDP umbrella Programme, *Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach*, and part-funding of UNDP research conducted by the Berlin-based NGO Adelphi into the connection between environment and conflict around Lake Chad³⁸.

The Facility will work in close conjunction with, and build upon, existing national as well as regional UNDP initiatives.

In Nigeria, these include the Integrated Community Stabilisation and Resilience project (funded by the EU and Japan), as well as a project (in its final stages) to support peace building and de-radicalisation in Northeast Nigeria (funded by Japan). The UNDP Nigeria office is also managing an EU-funded regional pilot small arms and light weapons programme. In Chad, the present programme will establish linkages to the ongoing early recovery, human security and border management projects (funded by UNDP and Japan). In Cameroon, linkages will be created with the ongoing Stabilisation and Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE, funded by Japan) and PVE and peace-building project (funded by PBSO). In Niger, effective linkages will be created with existing projects supporting 1) the resilience of communities and households, particularly women headed households, along Lake Chad, 2) a Peacebuilding Fund focusing on the socio-economic reintegration of former victims and associates of armed opposition groups in the Diffa region, and 3) a small project strengthening regional and community peace and security early warning mechanisms.

³⁸ The Facility is fully aligned with the statement of the Government of the Netherlands to the UN Security Council of March 2018, which called for a renewed focus on three of the root causes of the crisis: water and climate change; socio-economic challenges; lack of inclusion and empowerment of women. It is also aligned with the outcomes of the Expert Group meeting on Lake Chad, hosted by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hague, February 2019.

3.4.3 Other actors

All of the major donors are funding work in accessible areas around Lake Chad. The European Union is the largest, with significant national programmes in all four countries. Key initiatives in the region are detailed in Table 2 below.

At the request of LCBC, UNDP will undertake a full mapping of current initiatives in all eight affected States/Regions, as a preparatory action prior to Facility launch. The mapping will be shared with national Governments at central and State/Region level, and with donor partners.

Table 2: Overview of Related Initiatives and Programmes

Nigeria	Cameroon	Chad	Niger
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Humanitarian Response (through Intersectoral working group) • GIZ Borno resilience project, National Police Project and Border project • British Council Access to Justice and Security Project • World Bank MCRP project • UNICEF Child Soldier protection initiative • IOM DDR pilot project • IOM DDDR regional project (all four countries) • UNODC Access to Justice project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP/UNICEF prevention of violent extremism and peacebuilding in Cameroon and Chad (under development) • UNDP community empowerment and peace building in the Far North region • UNCT Résilience joint programme in <i>Logone et Chari</i> division • GIZ Police Programme and Socio-economic resilience of vulnerable youth in North • UNCT resilience project in the East Region to address central African refugee crisis • UNFPA / UNDP / UNICEF Stabilisation Project (Under development) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID funded counter-violent extremism in Chad (under development) • UNDP / UNICEF Prevention of Violent Extremism and Peacebuilding in Cameroon and Chad. • WFP / FAO Livelihoods and Resilience Project in the Lake Region • Ongoing MNTJ operations, especially with the civil component • GIZ Police Programme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Reintegration Program for the fighters of Boko Haram. • WB Community Action Project • UNODC security cooperation / de-radicalisation projects • GIZ Border & Police Programmes

3.5 Risks and assumptions

The overall risk level of the Facility is deemed to be medium to high, and a certain risk tolerance is required of all partners. The work will be undertaken in the midst of an active conflict zone, in areas with little initial Government presence.

Stabilisation can contribute to improved security but the insurgency, irrespective of the success of the stabilisation interventions (or even due to the success of the interventions), will continue to pose a

significant threat to the sustainability of the interventions. This risk must be accepted by all stakeholders involved in the Stabilisation Facility.

As a result, UNDP must actively work to continuously monitor, update and mitigate risks that fall under the following categories:

- Security risks;
- Political risks;
- Operational risks; and
- Reputational risks.

Also, upon launch of the Facility and prior to implementation of activities, a full Risk Analysis will be commissioned and form basis for all further risk identification, mitigation and management. The analysis will look into all potential risks, including social, environmental and climate-related risks as well as those unidentified at the stage of developing the initial project document.

The results of the analysis will be shared with the four national Partner Platforms and with the Regional Technical Coordination Committee for discussion and approval. The Risk analysis will update Annex 4, categorising the nature of all risks, probability and likely impact, proposed mitigation measures and responsibility for their implementation.

Facility management will report on risk to Partner Platforms on a quarterly basis and will update national 'window' risk logs accordingly. Partner Platforms will have the responsibility to manage risk at national levels, and to take action when and if risks materialise; for the regional level, or where the materialisation of risk requires budgets to be diverted from one RSF 'window' to another, the Regional Technical Coordination Committee will have responsibility for doing so.

3.5.1 Security risks

The Facility will specifically target areas vulnerable to continued infiltration and attacks, and it is possible – perhaps likely – that successful intervention may attract spoiler attacks by armed opposition groups. Output 1 of the Facility is designed to strengthen community security in mitigation.

Civil-military cooperation and improved coordination of security providers is key for improved physical security of project personnel and community members alike and is at the heart of the Facility methodology. Liaising closely with military forces from each Government concerned will help keep target areas secure while the transition to civilian law enforcement and community-organised security arrangements is undertaken. Building capacities of community security providers and supporting the establishment of community-based security systems (e.g. for early warning) for each target area is essential for limiting security risks. Physical risk can also be mitigated by fielding national third-party contractors, most of whom are resident in or near the target areas which may be off-limits to UN staff. Negotiations with formal and informal authorities and community leaders will also be held to secure a safe environment for Facility staff and implementing partners.

UNDP will implement the Facility under the guidance of the UN Department for Safety and Security and the authority of the UN Designated Security Official in each of the respective countries.

3.5.2 Political risks

The key political risk to successful implementation of the programme will be insufficient buy-in of key stakeholders. Major players may have divergent views and back different objectives. Stabilisation assistance can also be misused by government authorities or traditional leaders for political ends, or to side-line or isolate other parties or actors that are part of the peace process. Replacement of local or national government leaders, or the inability of local governments to function due to political transition, constitutes another political risk. If the authority of a central government or transitional authority remains in question, or when there are major divisions in the military, security and political support for Strategy implementation is not guaranteed. If the political dimension of stabilisation is perceived as largely guided by representatives of the international community, securing public support can be jeopardised. Lack of trust in leadership and political institutions, and the subsequent lack of interest of citizens to participate in political life, constitutes another political risk to successful implementation of the Strategy.

The risk of insufficient buy-in can be offset by the high degree of regional and national ownership of the LCBC Stabilisation Strategy and can be further mitigated through a process of extensive consultations at local, state and national level in the four countries, to ensure that all perspectives and interests are aligned as far as possible. In addition, it is expected that the Partner Platforms, the LCBC and AUC will continue to promote political buy-in at national level. Political advocacy, and extensive consultations at local, state, national and regional level in the four countries will help ensure that all perspectives are aligned as much as possible. Ensuring that all stakeholders are fully involved at the inception of the project and all beneficiaries involved as partners to decision-making re-design and implementation of the Facility will secure their ongoing interest and participation. Participation of the community in monitoring results is equally important. The risk of local government turnover can be mitigated by identifying and aligning with key community members who can support and promote ongoing community participation in the implementation process.

3.5.3 Operational risks

Insufficient capacity of UNDP to support stabilisation efforts constitutes the key operational risk. Attracting staff with relevant skill sets (strategic communication, HR, procurement, finance, quality assurance, reporting, management, etc.) to work in remote and insecure areas may prove difficult but can be mitigated in the first instance through utilisation of the UNDP crisis response system for rapid deployment of experienced personnel.

Other risks include the availability of sufficient well-qualified contractors and NGOs able to operate in remote areas, to be offset by prequalification exercises at the launch of the Facility; speed of procurement, recruitment, and payment mechanisms, to be mitigated through establishment of dedicated Facility Service Centres in each country (see Section 4.2); appropriateness of community engagement modalities will be assured through rapid conflict analysis of the target area and participatory dialogue with community Peace Committees.

Slow implementation of the Strategy by the AUC and LCBC constitutes another operational risk that may hamper immediate stabilisation. Building the substantive and operational capacities of the LCBC Stabilisation Secretariat under Output 4 will mitigate the risk involved.

3.5.4 Reputational risks

Reputational risks include associations (real or perceived) with parties of the conflict, political actors, rights violators, and need to be managed through local conflict analyses, wide stakeholder engagement, communication, and coordination with human rights and political arms of the UN system. In addition, regular transparent communication of project activities to all stakeholders as well as regular consultation with counterparts in the four countries will help in mitigating this risk.

Human rights due diligence (HRDD) will constitute an essential component of UNDP's risk management protocol. Assessing actual and potential human rights issues, acting on the findings, tracking responses, and communicating about how impacts may be addressed is essential for limiting reputational risk. The envisaged provision of support to human right defenders in monitoring, investigation and reporting on abuses, along with systematic vetting of potential local partners (individuals, companies and civil society organisations) that UNDP plans to work with, will also help mitigate reputational risk.

In addition, regular consultation with counterparts and regular transparent communication of project activities to all stakeholders involved will help mitigate reputational risk. All stakeholders (the donors, other agencies, and communities themselves) should be kept fully informed about the nature and level of risk involved. In addition to communicating intentions and achievements, controlling the narrative is also an essential component in the management of reputational risk.

Table 3: Overview of risk and mitigation measures

Risks / Externalities	Risk category	Impact & Probability	Mitigation measures	Risk owner
A lack of RSF financial resources	Financial	High & TBD	<p>Ensure consistent donor participation in national and regional Partner Platforms.</p> <p>Establish accountable, transparent and clear reporting and communication documents and mechanisms.</p> <p>Selection of total number of target areas based on available resources, allowing a comprehensive package of support for each target area.</p>	UNDP, LCBC
Currency devaluation, financial crises	Financial (external)	Medium & Low	<p>Ensure regular risk identification.</p> <p>Ensure that risk assessment form a key component of the national and regional Facility Boards.</p>	UNDP
A lack of coordination between National, State / Regional and Local Authorities in the 4 countries	Organisational	Medium & High	<p>Activities in target areas initiate when coordination mechanisms have been agreed to and are operational.</p>	National Government, State / Regional Government,
UNDP internal bottlenecks (procurement, payments, logistics)	Organisational	High & Low	<p>Establishment of RSF-exclusive Service Centres in the 4 countries.</p> <p>Advance planning of procurement and logistics as well as of implementation modalities on the ground (including the prepositioning of vendors and key recruitments).</p> <p>Use of established and tested implementation modalities in target areas.</p> <p>Use of UNDP staff and external rosters to temporarily fill the vacant positions, particular in the francophone countries.</p> <p>Engaging PSU early on to enable connecting with relevant colleagues from other COs to leverage lessons learnt and tap into existing LTAs (for solar, engineering services), etc. and best practice templates and solutions.</p>	UNDP

Table 3: Overview of risk and mitigation measures (Cont'd)

Lack of access due to insecurity (incl. consequences of mitigation of security risks)	Safety and Security; Operational	High & Medium	Timely identification of risks associated with security through engagement of a dedicated Security Specialist. Regular negotiations with military, formal and informal authorities and community leaders to secure a safe environment for implementing partners and community members themselves. Work with implementing partners with local knowledge and presence. Close coordination and communication with UNDSS. Adding security measures to increase security (procuring armoured vehicles for required locations, building adequate local security costs into the budgets of each of the RSF country 'windows').	Local Authorities, UNDP, UNDSS
Terrorism - Asymmetric attacks by AoG's	Safety and Security	Medium to Very High	Effective security coordination with formal and informal authorities, MNTF and other security authorities as appropriate, UNDSS/UNDP security coordination and effective information sharing on both current and emerging threats. Provision of security escorts and protective equipment in accordance with SRM.	Local Authorities, UNDSS, UNDP
Armed Conflict - Collateral damage during counterterrorist military operations, armed clashes	Safety and Security	Medium to High	Effective security coordination with formal and informal authorities, MNTF and other security authorities as appropriate, UNDSS/UNDP security coordination and effective information sharing on both current and emerging threats. Provision of security escorts and protective equipment in accordance with SRM.	Local Authorities, UNDP, UNDSS
Terrorism/Crime - Abduction of UN personnel or implementing partners/TP contractors	Safety and Security	Medium to High	Medium threat to UN as mitigation measures will be in place however significant risk to implementing partners, third party contractors working on the project.	Local Authorities, UNDP, UNDSS
Destruction and/ or theft of UN assets and third party contractor assets	Safety and Security	Medium to High	Effective security coordination with formal and informal authorities, MNTF and other security authorities as appropriate, The engagement of local security companies/ community provided security of no company. Appropriate mitigation measures in place to protect asset.	Local Authorities, UNDP, UNDSS
Perceived association of project with parties of the conflict, political actors, rights violators	Political	Medium & Medium	Wide stakeholder engagement, communication, and coordination with human rights and political arms of the UN system. Ensure regular and clear communication of the project and Facility objectives to all stakeholders.	National Government, State / Regional Government, Local Authorities, UNDP

Table 3: Overview of risk and mitigation measures (Cont'd)

Lack of interest of the local stakeholders/communities	Political	High & Medium	Assure that all stakeholders are fully involved at the inception of the project and involve all beneficiaries as partners to decision-making re design and implementation of the Facility.	UNDP, Local Authorities
Insufficient buy-in of or blockage by key National, State / Regional and Local stakeholders in the four countries.	Political	High & Medium	Political advocacy, and extensive consultations at local, state, national and regional level in the four countries, to ensure that all perspectives are as much as possible aligned. Set up a continuous Partner Platform dialogue between national authorities, UNDP senior management, and international partners. Ensure community participation in decision-making and monitoring.	LCBC, UNDP, International Partners
Continued attacks by armed opposition groups	Political	High & High	Work with religious leaders to promote inter- and intra-faith dialogue and inclusivity among community members, as well as to suppress violent narratives. Ensure that community resilience mechanisms such as early warning systems, and enhanced community security measures and structures are responsive and in place. Ensure close civil – military coordination in RSF target areas.	UNDP
Political situation/turnover of government	Political	Medium & Medium	Identify key community members who can support and promote community participation/management in activities in the event that local or national government leaders are replaced or that local governments are not able to function due to political transition	UNDP
Human rights violations by national and local security forces reduce trust in the Government	Political	High & Medium	Provide support to human rights defenders in monitoring, investigation and reporting on abuses. Systematic vetting of potential local partners.	National, State / Regional and Local Governments, LCBC, UNDP
The project might generate some waste during the infrastructure works	Environmental	Low & Moderate	All construction works will be carried out with appropriate waste-management regulations in mind. The contractors to be selected will be assessed on their ability to ensure waste generated by construction is disposed of in a manner that is in line with national and international regulations of construction waste management. While primary-level supervision of works will be conducted by local authorities/contracting company, secondary-level supervision will be conducted directly UNDP Engineers (wherever the security situation allows access for UN staff) and they will ensure that the rules and regulations on waste management will be complied with.	UNDP

Table 3: Overview of risk and mitigation measures (Cont'd)

Rights-holders might not have the capacity to claim their rights	Social/human rights	Medium & Moderate	The Facility will support human rights monitoring and reporting in the target areas, as part of a broader effort to promote accountability and compliance with all international and continental norms and standards, that nurtures relations of trust and confidence between security providers and local communities (see Activity 1.8).	UNDP
Discriminations against women and marginalized persons could be potentially reproduced	Social/human rights	Medium & Moderate	Upon launch of the Facility and prior to implementation of activities, a full Risk Analysis will be commissioned. The analysis will look into all potential risks, including social, environmental and climate-related risks as well as those unidentified at the stage of developing the initial project document.	UNDP, Local Authorities

3.6 Stakeholder engagement

The Facility was developed at the request of the Nigerian Government and has benefited from high-level consultations in each country. Drafts of the project document have also been shared with the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union for their comments, inputs and approval.

While the Facility aims to benefit all sections of the population in the insurgency-affected areas of Lake Chad, special attention will be paid to two groups of stakeholders:

- The working age population, defined as youth between the ages of 14 and 35;
- Women & girls.

3.6.1 A focus on youth

In terms of targeting within communities, the Facility will ensure a strong focus on youth, both as beneficiaries of the Programme, and as agents of it. The dire state of local economies has contributed to a sense of hopelessness amongst many young people across the Lake Chad Region. This hopelessness underpins recruitment into radical and extremist groups, but it also drives migration, youth crime and delinquency, and drug abuse to escape the hardships of daily life and the lack of vision that many young people hold for the future.

Youth constitute the majority of the population in the region. The usual conception of youth as covering the years 18-35 will be extended lower in response to UNDP research into the personal journeys of violent extremists, indicating the prevalence of radicalisation in childhood, between the ages of 14-17.³⁹

³⁹ Research based on survey of 400 known extremists, average age 21, UNDP *Regional Programme for Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa*, 2015

The important and positive contributions that young people can make and are making for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security in the world are recognised by the Security Council in Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security, unanimously adopted in December 2015.

3.6.2 Addressing the situation of women & girls

Issues of gender are at the heart of the crisis around Lake Chad and will be central to its sustainable resolution. Pillar nine of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy calls for specific actions to tackle a culture in which sexual and gender-based violence has become endemic and calls for a gender-sensitive approach to be mainstreamed into all responses.

Women have an important role to play in peacebuilding, as recognised by UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015) on Women, Peace & Security. UNDP will continuously advocate for the enhanced participation of women in decision-making on security at all levels and in all forums, working with LCBC and the AUC to promote gender balance in the governance structures and consultative mechanisms envisaged for implementation of both the Regional Stabilisation Strategy and the Regional Stabilisation Facility herein.

The gender strategy of the Facility will comprise a specific set of actions specifically aimed at the protection and empowerment of women and girls.

The strengthening of community safety and security should particularly benefit women and girls. UNDP will ensure a gender balance on all mechanisms for community engagement and decision-making forums on security as far as possible. The Facility will capture gender disaggregated data in the household questionnaires and perceptions of security in the studies to be undertaken. This can be used to support prioritisation of CIMIC quick impact projects in response, eg, extending security patrols to offer some protection from insurgents and harassment while working in the fields or collecting firewood/water etc.

Activities will also include specific action to raise awareness of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in communities, as well as to mobilise and advocate against it (Activity 1.1.7). Monitoring and reporting on SGBV will be included in the remit of work to be undertaken by human rights defenders (Activity 1.1.8). Gender awareness will be integrated into training of security providers – military, police, community vigilante groups – for avoidance of civilian harm (Activities 1.1.5 and 1.1.6).

The provision of essential infrastructure and basic services should disproportionately benefit women and girls, given the disproportionate burden they bear in regard as family providers and carers. Renewable energy will obviate the need for collection of firewood, and new boreholes and wells should ensure a ready supply of clean water. Health centres – as well as cash transfers to households caring for the most vulnerable – should reduce the burden still further.

Improved access to education, including “catch-up” literacy classes for teenage girls, is a tool of empowerment. Women will be given equal opportunity to access livelihood options. As necessary, women-only work brigades will be established under the cash-for-work option. As per Section 2.6.4, the strategic communications work of the Facility will ensure space for women’s voices and concerns.

All Joint Action Plans will be audited by the UNDP gender team in each Country Office prior to presentation to Partner Platforms for review and approval.

3.7 South-south and triangular cooperation

The Stabilisation Facility strategy draws on a recently undertaken UNDP stabilisation stock-take exercise as well as evaluations of its worldwide stabilisation programmes⁴⁰. Lessons learnt have underpinned the development of the concept and strategy of the intervention proposed herein⁴¹.

The UNDP Global and Regional practice community continues to extract lessons from the organisation's stabilisation programmes in many countries in the world. The Facility will benefit from the global and regional experience, through publications, access to UNDP experts and peer-to-peer learning. Partnership with the African Union for capacity development of LCBC should allow further opportunities for the Facility to access and channel experience of other relevant African stabilisation efforts.

3.8 Knowledge management

The Facility will have a strong commitment to knowledge management, for a number of purposes:

1. To ensure that the work of the Facility is evidence-based, appropriate, and conforms to the imperative of the “*do no harm*” principle;
2. To inform the strategic communications work of the Facility and the LCBC RSS, offering counter-narratives to disrupt the radicalisation and recruitment efforts of violent extremists;
3. To demonstrate ‘proof-of-concept’ with international partners, establishing an effective and cost-efficient model for replication to other inaccessible or insecure target areas and communities of Lake Chad;
4. To facilitate improved and better coordinated stabilisation practice of all stakeholders working in the Lake Chad region.

Result area 1 of the Facility will proceed via development of Joint Action Plans that will utilise GIS software to create knowledge products that aid design of interventions and can build a visual database of results⁴²; Community perception studies on security and local conflict analyses will inform the Joint Action Plans; climate change fragility assessments will inform the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs).

The strong commitment of the Facility to ongoing monitoring of its work will be reflected in the publication of quarterly reports on activity, for review by the Partner Platforms in each country. A user-friendly brochure – with donor visibility – will be prepared to communicate the strategy and work of the Facility to new audiences globally.

On behalf of LCBC, and in fulfilment of the relevant provision of the RSS, Component 2 of the Facility will establish a regional knowledge management platform (KMP) for stabilisation, in French and English

⁴⁰ The stocktaking exercise covered UNDP stabilisation initiatives in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen amongst others.

⁴¹ See Annex 1, UNDP Concept Note for Stabilisation of Lake Chad, for explication of UNDP's approach to stabilisation, lessons learned in the stock-take exercise, and how these lessons have translated into the concept and strategy proposed in this project document.

⁴² Using the KOBO toolbox, a form of open source software that enables the management and reporting of GIS data and information in a manner that is visually attractive and user friendly. See: <http://www.kobotoolbox.org>

language versions. The knowledge management platform is envisaged as a high-quality web-based resource to capture and disseminate a broad range of knowledge on stabilisation for stakeholders and practitioners. The KMP is intended as a dynamic resource rather than as a 'static' website and will be updated with new content by dedicated staff on a daily basis. It will perform four functions:

- **Observatory** - The KMP act as a "one-stop" portal for open-source news reports and statistical data available in regard to the activity of NSAGs around Lake Chad and trends in regard to security and stabilisation, humanitarian access etc. The Observatory will seek to measure public perception of security issues and responses via the Community Security Perception Studies, human rights monitoring reports, and other sources.
- **Coordination Tool** - The KMP will collate mapping and coordination outputs from the teams in each State/Region into a central, overarching coordination matrix of past, present and planned interventions for stabilisation, early recovery, development and resilience in the insurgency-affected areas of Lake Chad.
- **Practice Community** - The KMP will be used to inform, network, and engage a community of stabilisation practitioners and stakeholders around Lake Chad through the provision of - relevant news, a diary of upcoming conferences and events, regular features on stabilisation work, and a moderated blog discussion forum for registered members.
- **Resource Base** - The KMP will provide repository for research and good practice notes to support the stabilisation process, for strategies, action plans, reports and project documents, GIS mapping, and lessons learned in the Lake Chad region and elsewhere, etc.

3.9 Sustainability and scaling up

As per preceding sections, the Facility has been designed as an engine to promote national and regional ownership, and as a partnership instrument to aid resolution of the crisis through support to local, national and regional capacities and action.

National capacities at all levels – central, State/Region, LGA/Commune – will be supported to extend Government presence into currently inaccessible or insecure areas, to secure the peace and rebuild the social contract between the local population and the State, and to initiate a transition from humanitarian assistance to development and resilience.

Support to implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy is intended to further cement regional ownership of a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated framework for multi-party intervention.

Environmental sustainability is a key concern of the Facility and mainstreamed within its design. Climate change fragility assessments will inform Joint Action Plans for all target areas, along with specific plans for harnessing renewable energy to provide light and power to communities.

IV. Project Management

4.1 Cost efficiency and effectiveness

The Regional Stabilisation Facility herein aims to provide a cost-efficient as well as effective model for the stabilisation of the insurgency-affected areas of Lake Chad.

UNDP's previous experience in stabilisation validates the agency's ability and agility to facilitate quick and reliable delivery. UNDP has acquired institutional capacity and in-house know-how to put in place fast-track mechanisms with dedicated operation support to the facility which facilitate and accelerate operational transactions while ensuring transparency, value for money, accountability, effectiveness of partnerships and quality assurance.

The Regional Stabilisation Facility herein, which requires the ability to deliver a particularly high-volume of activities, within short-time frames and to international standard, in remote and challenging conditions.

UNDP will augment its existing delivery capacity by establishing stand-alone Service Centres, enhancing current Country Office structures, to provide fast-track operational support to Facility implementation. Each Facility Service Centre will comprise a mixed team of national and international staff, serving as engineers, procurement experts, finance and human resources associates, and drivers that can be scaled appropriately to the volume of funding available, e.g., more engineers or procurement officers may be hired as contractors charged to the programme budget line for infrastructure, as and when additional partner contributions are received.

The Service Centre model, and the configuration of operations staff required, is based upon previous UNDP experience and lessons learned in delivering successful stabilisation programmes in Iraq, Libya and elsewhere.

The programmatic need to move at speed to consolidate military gains and re-establish civilian control of target areas dictates a narrow range of immediate stabilisation activities that can be delivered quickly; such a model is by nature cost-efficient, as direct costs – staff wages in particular – need to be budgeted over a relatively short period of two years. The Facility has been designed to launch with a maximum ratio of direct costs to programme budget of 20%.

The holistic approach to immediate stabilisation, designed to make currently vulnerable areas both more secure and more liveable, will be subject to ongoing unit cost analysis based on the number of direct beneficiaries of each selected target area, to allow comparisons to be made and a financially and programmatically viable model for replication to be established. Establishing a staggered approach – in which subsequent phases of the Facility overlap with this envisaged first phase – should also allow economies of scale and incremental reduction in the ratio of direct costs to programme budget.

This model, then, should deliver significant economies of scale as the Facility attracts more resources, driving down direct costs to partners in line with Facility aspirations to establish a cost-efficient, as well as programmatically effective, contribution to stabilisation of the region.

4.2 The project set-up

4.2.1 Offices

Addressing the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus requires development actors to be present and active on the ground in parallel with humanitarian actors if the *New Way of Working* is to be operationalised and a coordinated trajectory established for the transition from humanitarian assistance and early recovery and development.

UNDP is already resident and operational in many of the insurgency-affected areas – in Maidaguri in Borno State, Nigeria, In Diffa, Niger, in the Far North of Cameroon, in Bol and Baga Sola in Chad – with inclusive and participatory programming for community mobilisation and security, for reintegration of former combatants, and for improving livelihood opportunities.

Under the Facility, UNDP will expand its footprint to establish a programme presence in the other insurgency-affected States of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy where it does not currently have a presence, i.e., in Hajder Lamis, Chad; in North Region, Cameroon; in Yobe and Adamawa States, Nigeria.

4.2.2 Four national teams

Four national teams will be established to implement the country-specific activities of the Facility (for Result area 1, Immediate Stabilisation, as well as the coordination and TAPs process components of Result area 2, Support to the Regional Stabilisation Strategy).

Each national team will be led by a P5 Stabilisation Manager, and will include both substantive staff, and operations staff organised as per the envisaged dedicated Service Centre model (see above). The teams will work autonomously, under the line management of the UNDP Resident Representative for the country.

Facility staffing for the implementation of National Windows will vary according to the volume of partner contributions being delivered at any particular phase of implementation. For the first phase of Facility implementation herein, a core staffing structure is proposed of a P5 CTA and P4 Operations Manager for each country, to oversee the substantive and operational wings of each team. The need for further substantive positions will be defined on a country-by-country basis, in each national 'window'. Facility Service Centres will be fully scale-able, comprising engineers, admin/finance assistants, procurement specialists, Human Resources associates, field security officers and drivers.

4.2.3 Regional coordination and support to LCBC

Overall management of the Facility will be located in N'djamena, Chad, and will be co-located with the LCBC Stabilisation Secretariat in dedicated premises to be established, equipped and maintained with Facility funds. The UNDP regional team will coordinate but not directly manage implementation of national 'windows' of the Facility and will take responsibility for provision of centralised services to Country Offices and LCBC; monitoring, reporting and fund management; liaison with the LCBC Stabilisation Secretariat.

The team will comprise: Stabilisation Facility Fund Manager (P4), Regional Communications Specialist (P3); Regional M&E Expert; GIS Analyst and three international UN Volunteers (IUNVs): as Project Leader for LCBC Finance & Admin Capacities; Project Associate for Mapping and Aid Tracking; Project Associate for Knowledge Management, Finance Admin Assistant and Driver.

4.2.4 Ensuring an immediate start

Given the compressed timeframes for implementation of immediate stabilisation activities, it is considered vital that the Facility has temporary staff in place at the moment of launch, while longer-term staff are in process of recruitment, establishes the approvals and relations necessary for operation in each country, and undertakes preliminary work such as procurement surveys and prequalification exercises.

As such, UNDP will make a proportion of its contribution to the Facility available in the form of preparatory assistance. In regard to immediate staffing needs, the following measures will be taken:

- UNDP will utilise its SURGE crisis-response mechanism to mobilise internal secondments for the key senior positions, to ensure immediate deployment of experienced staff to launch the Facility and to train their permanent replacements;
- UNDP's will utilise its Crisis Response Unit roster of consultants to deploy qualified and experienced individuals on short to medium-term assignments;
- UNDP will revise Term of Reference of project staff of the current Go. Germany regional stabilisation intervention to serve the Facility in tandem, while ensuring complementarity, clear division of work and explicit allocation of resources of the two interventions (project and Facility);
- UNDP Country Offices will redeploy existing national staff for CO Operations and from projects as needed, and as available.

4.2.5 Collaborative arrangements with other interventions

The Facility will collaborate with other actors and projects in four dimensions;

- 1) The Facility will build upon the second phase of the Go. Germany funded project "*Integrated Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin (Phase II)*", both in terms of its support to implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, the Governor's Forum, and other activities at national level.
- 2) UNDP will ensure that activities of the Facility are implemented in close coordination with other potentially supportive projects and programmes for security, governance and resilience in in each Country Office portfolio;

Component 2 of the Facility, Support to Implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy envisages two coordination mechanisms that should allow synergies to be established with the work of other actors:

- 3) The Task Force for substantive pillars of the Strategy, to be aligned with the thematic inter-Agency UNISS working groups, and extended through UNCT coordination in each country to support a New Way of Working in each insurgency-affected State or Region;
- 4) Enhanced sub-national coordination of interventions, to be undertaken by the Governors of each State or Region, in support of the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy.

4.2.6 Monitoring and Evaluation

UNDP will establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for all Facility windows, Regional and country-specific, and will elaborate quarterly progress and financial reports for Partner Platform review. Each report will provide an accurate account of implementation of the Facility, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the log frame matrix (which will be further developed during the Preparatory Phase). Reports will be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the Facility. The final reports, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the implementation of the first phase of the Facility.

A Mid-term evaluation will be carried out for the Facility via independent consultants contracted by UNDP in month 15 after Facility launch. The mid-term evaluation will be carried out for problem solving and learning purposes, in particular with respect to a) the adaptive and iterative approach the Facility will take to ensure the log frame and results matrix remain valid and b) the nexus approach. The mid-term evaluation report will be shared with the Government authorities and donor partners. The Partner Platform will analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the Facility.

4.2.7 Project assurance and audit arrangements

The project assurance function for the Facility will be the responsibility of the UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa, which will carry out periodic internal monitoring missions to assess progress toward the desired results and make recommendations for adjustments as deemed necessary. Donor partners may undertake additional monitoring visits both through their own staff or through independent consultants for independent monitoring reviews.

The Facility will be subject to the internal and external auditing procedures provided for in the financial regulations, rules and directives of UNDP.

The audit of UNDP activities is carried out by external and/or internal auditors:

- External audit: fulfilled by the United Nations Board of Auditors (BoA); and
- Internal audit: assigned to the Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI)

All externally available information on accountability of UNDP, including disclosure of audit reports can be found at: <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/accountability/overview.html>

In accordance with Executive Board decision 2012/18 of June 2012, all audit reports issued by UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI) since 1 December 2012 are publicly disclosed on this website, one month after they have been issued internally.

4.2.8 Resource Mobilisation

The Facility is intended as an intervention that is likely to have multiple, overlapping phases, given the scale of the territory that remains vulnerable to incursion and attack by armed opposition groups and the scope of the security-humanitarian-development challenge.

The intention of the Facility is to achieve 'proof of concept' through the first phase herein, and to seek further resources from Governments and international partners on an on-going basis. Attention will also be paid to mobilising resources from the private sector as possible, and as appropriate.

It is anticipated that future phases of the Facility will learn valuable lessons from implementation of the first phase herein and will benefit from economies of scale in terms of the direct costs arising from the field work required.

V. Results Framework

<p>Intended Outcome as stated in the Regional Programme Results and Resource Framework: Regional Programme Outcome 3: Regional institutions sustain peace and build resilience to crises and shocks Strategic Plan Outcome 3: Strengthen resilience to shocks and crises / Strategic Plan Signature Solution 2: Strengthen effective, accountable and inclusive governance Outcome indicators as stated in the Regional Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets: Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age (baselines and targets – as per SP 2018-2021) (Regional Programme/Strategic Plan 3.1)</p>	
<p>Applicable Output(s) from the UNDP Strategic Plan: National capacities strengthened for reintegration, reconciliation, peaceful management of conflict and prevention of violent extremism in response to national policies and priorities (Strategic Plan Output 3.2.1)</p>	
<p>Project Intermediate Outcome: National and sub-national actors are enabled to establish vertical and horizontal partnerships with other critical actors to set-up and support peace infrastructures (Regional Programme Output 3.3)</p>	
<p>Project Immediate Outcomes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Working methodology for immediate stabilization in the target areas is established and agreed between stakeholders Indicator: Degree to which immediate stabilization in the target areas is achieved. *Measured on a scale of 0 - 5, 0 – unchanged; 5 – 100% achievement of the targets set in outputs 1,2,3. Baseline: 0; Target: 5 (targets of outputs 1,2,3 reached) Regional framework for extended stabilization is functioning Indicator: Degree to which regional framework for extended stabilization is functioning. *Measured on a scale of 0-5, 5 being the measure of complete achievement of the targets set in outputs 4, 5, 6. Baseline: 0; Target: 5 (targets of outputs 4,5,6 reached) 	

Project title and Atlas Project Number: Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS ⁴³	DATA SOURCE	BASELINE		TARGETS (by frequency of data collection)		DATA COLLECTION METHODS & RISKS
			Value	Year	Year 1	Year 2	
Output 1: Community Safety & Security Strengthened	1.1 National infrastructures for peace established or strengthened, with UNDP support, upon request (SP Output Indicator 3.2.1.3)	Stabilisation Committees, quarterly progress reports	No	2019	YES	YES	Risk: Project staff cannot access target areas due to insecurity.

⁴³ It is recommended that projects use output indicators from the Strategic Plan IRRF, as relevant, in addition to project-specific results indicators. Indicators should be disaggregated by sex or for other targeted groups where relevant.

	1.2 Percentage increase in presence of security providers in target areas	Quarterly progress reports	TBC (once target areas are agreed upon)	2019	25% increase	40% increase	
	1.3 Percentage of security providers trained on human rights and prevention of gender-based violence	Quarterly progress report	TBC (once target areas are agreed)	2019	40%	100%	
	1.4 Community perception of safety and security in target areas	Community perception studies on public safety and security	TBC	2019	TBC, based on first set of studies	TBC, based on first set of studies	
	1.5 Number of communities with early warning systems	Project management, Peace Committees	0	2019	TBC (once the target areas are decided upon)	TBC	
Output 2: Essential Infrastructure & Basic Services Functioning	2.1 Percentage of cleared contamination areas	Implementing partner reports	TBC	2019	TBC	TBC	Risk: lack of complete data on contaminated areas
	2.2 Number of new or rehabilitated basic infrastructure projects handed over to local authorities and communities	Quarterly progress reports	0	2019	TBC upon completion of Project Documents of the National Windows	TBC	
	2.3 Population percentage with access to basic services (health, education, and agriculture and fisheries extension services)	Ministries of Health, Education, Agriculture and Fisheries	TBC (once target areas are agreed)	2019	TBC	TBC	
Output 3: Livelihood opportunities available	3.1 Number of people (disaggregated by sex and age) benefiting from livelihood options	Quarterly progress reports	TBC (once target areas are agreed)	2019	TBC	TBC	Risk: Difficulties in publicly disseminating and communicating complete data due to security and privacy concerns
	3.2 Number of men and women (sex and age disaggregated) benefiting from vocational or other training	Quarterly progress reports	TBC (once target areas are agreed)	2019	TBC	TBC	Risk: Participants refuse collection of data due to security and privacy concerns

Output 4: Enhanced capacities of the LCBC Capacities to implement the RSS	4.1 Number of people accessing the knowledge management platform (Observatory, Coordination tool, Community of Practice and Resource base must all be operational before measuring)	Website hits, CoP activity logs	0	2019	TBC	TBC	
	4.2 Extent to which the LCDC is capable to coordinate the RSS *Measured on a scale from 0 – 3: 0 – no capacity, 1 – limited capacity, 2 – average capacity, 3 – good capacity; **Calculated by accumulating the criteria: a) TAPs are standardized and interconnected; b) Joint communication products are agreed upon; c) RSS Steering Committee & International Support Group meet at least once annually.	LCDC reports, meeting minutes, quarterly progress reports	0	2019	2	3	
Output 5: Improved cross-border cooperation and coordination	5.1 Number of cross-border interventions implemented in LCB	Quarterly progress reports	TBC (once target areas are agreed)	2019	TBC	TBC	
	6.1 Number of Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) in place	Project management, Strategy Task Force	0	2019	0	8	
Output 6: State/Region Territorial Action Plans in place							

VI. Monitoring and Evaluation

In accordance with UNDP's programming policies and procedures, the project will be monitored through the following monitoring and evaluation plans:

6.1 Monitoring plan

Monitoring Activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected Action	Partners (if joint)	Cost (if any)
Track results progress	Progress data against the results indicators in the RRF will be collected and analysed to assess the progress of the project in achieving the agreed outputs.	Quarterly, or in the frequency required for each indicator.	Slower than expected progress will be addressed by project management.	Partner Platforms	2,260,000
Monitor and Manage Risk	Identify specific risks that may threaten achievement of intended results. Identify and monitor risk management actions using a risk log. This includes monitoring measures and plans that may have been required as per UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards. Audits will be conducted in accordance with UNDP's audit policy to manage financial risk.	Quarterly	Risks are identified by project management and actions are taken to manage risk. The risk log is actively maintained to keep track of identified risks and actions taken.		2,000,000
Learn	Knowledge, good practices and lessons will be captured regularly, as well as actively sourced from other projects and partners and integrated back into the project.	Ongoing	Relevant lessons are captured by the project team and used to inform management decisions.	LCBC	
Project Quality Assurance	The quality of the project will be assessed against UNDP's quality standards to identify project strengths and weaknesses and to inform management decision making to improve the project.	Design QA – 2019 Implementation QA – 2020 Closure QA - 2021	Areas of strength and weakness will be reviewed by project management and used to inform decisions to improve project performance.		
Review and Make Course Corrections	Internal review of data and evidence from all monitoring actions to inform decision making.	Quarterly	Performance data, risks, lessons and quality will be discussed by the project board and used to make course corrections.	Partner Platforms	
Project Report	A progress report will be presented to the Project Board and key stakeholders, consisting of progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level, the annual project quality rating summary, an updated risk log with mitigation measures, and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period.	Annually, and at the end of the project (final report)			
Project Review (Partner Platforms)	The project's governance mechanism (i.e., project board) will hold regular project reviews to assess the performance of the project and review the Multi-Year Work Plan to ensure realistic budgeting over the life of the project. In the project's final	Quarterly	Any quality concerns or slower than expected progress should be discussed by the project		

	year, the Project Board shall hold an end-of project review to capture lessons learned and discuss opportunities for scaling up and to socialise project results and lessons learned with relevant audiences.		board and management actions agreed to address the issues identified.	
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6.2 Evaluation plan

Evaluation Title	Partners (if joint)	Related Strategic Plan Output	RPD Outcome	Planned Completion Date	Key Stakeholders	Evaluation	Cost and Source of Funding
Mid-term evaluation		3.2.1	3	15 th Month			\$130,000
Final evaluation				24 th Month		Partner Platforms	

VII. Multi-year work plan ^{44,45}

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	Planned Budget by Year				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET	
		H2 2019	2020	H1 2021	Total		Funding Source	Budget Description
Output 1: Community Safety and Security Improved Gender marker: GEN2	Activity 1.1: Enhancing coordination on security at community level	180,000	0	0	180,000			
	Activity 1.2: Community engagement in each target area	320,000	0	0	320,000			
	Activity 1.3: Mapping the local situation	480,000	0	0	480,000			
	Activity 1.4: Civil-Military Coordination	400,000	400,000	200,000	1,000,000			
	Activity 1.5: Increasing law enforcement presence	0	4,000,000	4,000,000	8,000,000			
	Activity 1.6: Community contributions to Public Safety and Security	0	3,000,000	3,000,000	4,800,000			
	Activity 1.7: Addressing critical human security issues	0	800,000	400,000	1,200,000			
	Activity 1.8: Promoting Human Rights and civilian protection in target areas	200,000	1,000,000	400,000	1,600,000			
	MONITORING	100,000	300,000	140,000	540,000			
	Sub-Total for Output 1	1,680,000	9,500,000	8,140,000	19,320,000			19,320,000
Output 2: Essential Infrastructure & Basic Services Functioning	Activity 2.1: GIS Mapping of Target Areas	350,000	0	0	350,000			
	Activity 2.2: Explosive Ordnance Contamination Assessment & Clearance	600,000	600,000	0	1,200,000			

⁴⁴ Cost definitions and classifications for programme and development effectiveness costs to be charged to the project are defined in the Executive Board decision DP/2010/32

⁴⁵ Changes to a project budget affecting the scope (outputs), completion date, or total estimated project costs require a formal budget revision that must be signed by the project board. In other cases, the UNDP programme manager alone may sign the revision provided the other signatories have no objection. This procedure may be applied for example when the purpose of the revision is only to re-phase activities among years

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	Planned Budget by Year				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET	
		H2 2019	2020	H1 2021	Total		Funding Source	Budget Description
<i>Gender marker: GEN2</i>	Activity 2.3: Preparation of Joint Action Plans, Infrastructure & Services Component	400,000	0	0	400,000			
	Activity 2.4: Infrastructure design & preparation of BoQs	1,000,000	1,000,000	0	2,000,000			
	Activity 2.5: Construction Works	0	15,000,000	7,000,000	20,000,000			
	Activity 2.6: Provision of equipment & capacity development support	0	600,000	1,400,000	2,000,000			
	MONITORING	100,000	500,000	250,000	850,000			
	Sub-Total for Output 2	2,450,000	17,700,000	8,650,000	28,800,000			28,800,000
	Activity 3.1: Establishment of Livelihood Options for each Target Area	320,000	0	0	320,000			
	Activity 3.2: Identification of households and beneficiaries	360,000	600,000	0	960,000			
	Activity 3.3: Contracting livelihood option providers	0	240,000	0	240,000			
	Activity 3.4: Provision of livelihood opportunities	0	12,000,000	6,000,000	18,000,000			
Output 3: Increased livelihood opportunities for all households <i>Gender marker: GEN2</i>	MONITORING	160,000	250,000	150,000	560,000			
	Sub-Total for Output 3	840,000	13,090,000	6,150,000	20,080,000			20,080,000
	Activity 4.1: Establishing the LCBC Stabilisation Secretariat	749,750	1,499,500	749,750	2,999,999			
	Activity 4.2: Providing technical advisory support to LCBC for RSS Implementation	150,000	400,000	150,000	700,000			
	Activity 4.3: Providing operational and administrative management capacity support to LCBC	100,000	300,000	200,000	600,000			
Output 4: Enhanced Capacities of the LCBC to implement the Regional Stabilisation Strategy <i>Gender marker: GEN2</i>	MONITORING	20,000	50,000	30,000	100,000			
	Sub-Total for Output 4	1,049,750	2,199,500	1,149,750	4,399,000			4,399,000

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	Planned Budget by Year			RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET			
		H2 2019	2020	H1 2021		Total	Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
Output 5: Improved Coordination Cooperation Gender marker: GEN2	Activity 5.1: Facilitation of RSS Steering Committee & Int. Support Group	40,000	80,000	40,000					
	Activity 5.2: Providing support to RSS Cross-Border Consultation & Coordination mechanisms	250,000	200,000	150,000					
	Activity 5.3: Establishment of RSS Implementation Task Force	50,000	100,000	50,000					
	MONITORING	10,000	20,000	10,000					
	Sub-Total for Output 5	200,000	600,000	300,000	1,100,000				1,000,000
Output 6: State/Region Territorial Action Plans Developed Gender marker: GEN2	Activity 6.1: Supporting National-level Coordination	120,000	230,000	120,000					
	Activity 6.2: Preparation of eight State/Region Territorial Action Plans	240,000	1,980,000	240,000					
	Activity 6.3: Territorial Coordination in all insurgency-affected States/Regions	120,000	230,000	120,000					
	MONITORING	10,000	20,000	10,000					
	Sub-Total for Output 6	490,000	2,460,000	490,000	3,440,000				3,440,000
UNDP Direct Costs @ 20%	UNDP Staff	3,000,000	7,000,000	3,000,000					
	Travel	97,500	195,000	97,500					
	Per Diems	116,250	232,500	116,250					
	Office Rental & Running Costs	115,500	231,000	115,500					
	Office Equipment	200,000	30,000	0					
	Vehicles	575,000	0	0					
	Vehicle Maintenance & Running Costs	55,500	111,000	55,500					
	Project Assurance	20,000	40,000	20,000					
	Sub-Total for Direct Costs	4,179,750	7,839,500	3,404,750	15,424,000				
	EVALUATION	0	0	130,000	130,000				
Sub-total									92,593,000

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	Planned Budget by Year				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET	
		H2 2019	2020	H1 2021	Total		Funding Source	Budget Description
General Management Support @ 8%								7,407,000
TOTAL USD								100,000,000

VIII. Governance and management arrangements

8.1 Funding modalities

The Stabilisation Facility will operate as a basket fund to enable multiple donors to provide cost-sharing of the Project Document herein.

The basket fund envisaged will have five 'windows' for contributions:

- Four national Windows - For partners wishing to contribute to Results Area 1; and
- A Regional Window - For partners wishing to contribute to Result area 2.

It is also possible for donor contributions to be earmarked against the three Output areas separately, at regional or national level, *i.e.*, against activities for:

- Community Safety and Security;
- Essential Infrastructure and Basic Services; and
- Provision of livelihood opportunities.

National Windows have been established to allow and encourage Government cost-sharing from the affected countries. Wherever possible according to sources of funds and regulations pertaining, international partners are discouraged from earmarking between the Windows and Outputs/Activities.

All five windows will be governed by separate Partner Platforms to be established (see Section 8.3). Implementation of each National Window will be the responsibility of a dedicated substantive team supported by a Facility Service Centre, as per section 4.2.2. Each team will work autonomously, with centralised services, coordination, reporting and other support functions provided regionally.

8.2 Governance arrangements

The LCBC Steering Committee for the Regional Stabilisation Strategy will function as the Regional Stabilisation Facility Steering Committee.

The mandate and composition⁴⁶ of the RSS Steering Committee will be adapted to allow it to serve also as the RSF overarching body, responsible for regional coordination and alignment.

While the precise composition of the RSS Steering Committee is a matter for LCBC, UNDP has proposed – and will advocate for – the participation of the SRSGs of UNOWAS and UNOCA for the purposes of strategic and political support to the Strategy and the interlinkages with the broader UNISS envisaged by the Strategy.

⁴⁶ The United Nations Resident Coordinators of the Lake Chad Basin countries will be a member of the RSS-RSF Steering Committee.

8.2.1 RSF Technical Coordination Committee

A Regional Technical Coordination Committee will be established for the Facility, as a sub-committee of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy Steering (RSS) Committee.

The Regional Technical Coordination Committee will be chaired by LCBC. Members will include the African Union support team for the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, donor partners to the Facility, one of the UN Resident Coordinators from the affected countries on a rotating basis, and the UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa (RSCA). UNDP Country Offices implementing national windows will participate on as needed bases to report to the Committee.

The Regional Technical Coordination Committee will review and integrate national window Annual Work Plans into a coherent overarching work plan for the region, undertake risk review and advise on risk management.,

UNDP will commission and present a detailed risk analysis and management paper in regard to the work of the Facility, for review by the first meeting of the Regional Technical Coordination Committee.

8.2.2 Partner Platforms

The four national windows will be governed by national Partner Platforms (referred to as Project Boards in UNDP's rules and regulations). The Partner Platforms will review the strategic direction of each national window on an annual or as-needed basis, ensuring accountability and proper oversight of project management and have ultimate decision-making authority. The Head of Stabilisation in each country will provide regular updates to the partners on a quarterly basis, including updates on risk analysis and management. If required, especially for any important risk related reviews, ad-hoc meetings will be organized to discuss risk levels and mitigating measures. The bi-annual meetings will be held to establish and/or review progress toward Annual Work Plans. This will entail setting and revising deliverables and achievement of benchmarks, alongside opportunities for fine-tuning and adjustments, including any prioritisation of activities. To ensure UNDP's ultimate accountability, Partner Platform decisions should be made in accordance with corporate UNDP standards that shall ensure best value to money, fairness, integrity, transparency and effective accountability.

The Partner Platforms will be co-chaired by a national Government representative and the UN Resident Representative and, to the extent possible, will be light operational structures ensuring speedy and efficient decision making. The Partner Platform will specifically be responsible for the following:

- Meeting regularly to deliberate on the Project's progress The Project Board has a decision-making role within the Project and thus will deliver direction and recommendations to ensure that the agreed deliverables are produced satisfactorily in line with the Project Document. This also means that the Project Board can make changes to the project based on the progress reports and recommendations from project staff and partners alike;
- Revising and assessing the detailed Project Plan and AWP, including Atlas reports covering activity definition, quality criteria, issue log, risk log and the monitoring and communication plan;
- Providing overall guidance and direction to the project;
- Addressing any project-related issues as raised by the Head of Stabilisation;

- Providing guidance and agreeing on possible countermeasures/management actions to address specific risks;
- Agreeing on the Head of Stabilisation's milestones in the Annual Work Plan and quarterly plans when required;
- Reviewing Combined Delivery Reports (CDR) prior to certification by the Implementing Partner(s);
- Reviewing each of the Annual Work Plan upon completion, and approving continuation to the next AWP;
- Appraising the Project Annual Progress Report, and making recommendations for the next AWP;
- Providing ad-hoc direction and advice for exceptional situations when tolerances of parties are exceeded;
- Providing strategic orientation and recommendations to the Head of Stabilisation and implementers;
- Ensuring full implementation of the project and assuring that all project deliverables have been produced satisfactorily by the end of the project;
- Reviewing and approving the final project report, including lessons learnt; and
- Commissioning mid-term and final project evaluations.

Each Partner Platform will comprise the following roles and functions:

- **The Executive** - The role of the Executive will be held by the UNDP National Head of Stabilisation, or Regional Stabilisation Coordinator. The Executive is ultimately responsible for the project, assisted by the Senior Beneficiary and Senior Supplier. The Executive's role is to ensure that the project is focused throughout its life cycle on achieving its expected results and delivering outputs that will contribute to longer-term impact. The Executive should ensure that the project gives value for money, ensuring a cost-conscious approach to the project, balancing the demands of beneficiary and supplier.
- **The Senior Beneficiary** - Representatives of the participating Governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria will jointly the role of Senior Beneficiary respectively in each Project Board. The Senior Beneficiary is responsible for validating the needs and for monitoring that the solution will meet those needs within the lifecycle of the project. The role represents the interests of all those who will benefit from the project. The Senior Beneficiary role monitors progress against targets and quality criteria.
- **Senior Supplier** - Donor partners, LCBC and the AUC, and the UN Resident Coordinator's Office in each country will hold the role of Senior Supplier. The Senior Supplier represents the interests of the parties which provide funding and/or technical expertise to the project (designing, developing, facilitating, procuring, implementing). The Senior Supplier's primary function within the Board is to provide guidance regarding the technical feasibility of the project. The Senior Supplier role must have the authority to commit or acquire supplier resources as required.

- **Quality Assurance** - The Quality Assurance role supports the Executive Board and is assumed by the UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa for all Project Boards (Partner Platforms), which will undertake objective and independent oversight and monitoring functions on behalf of each Board. This role ensures that appropriate programme management milestones are managed and completed.

IX. Legal context and risk management

9.1 Legal context standard clauses

This project forms part of an overall programmatic framework under which several separate associated country level activities will be implemented. When assistance and support services are provided from this Project to the associated country level activities, this document shall be the “Project Document” instrument referred to in: (i) the respective signed SBAA’s for the specific countries; or (ii) in the Supplemental Provisions to the Project Document attached to the Project Document in cases where the recipient country has not signed an SBAA with UNDP, attached hereto and forming an integral part hereof. All references in the SBAA to “Executing Agency” shall be deemed to refer to “Implementing Partner.”

This project will be implemented by UNDP (“Implementing Partner”) in accordance with its financial regulations, rules, practices and procedures.

X. Risk management standard clauses

1. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will comply with the policies, procedures and practices of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS.)
2. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the [project funds]⁴⁷ [UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document]⁴⁸ are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.
3. Social and environmental sustainability will be enhanced through application of the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards (<http://www.undp.org/ses>) and related Accountability Mechanism (<http://www.undp.org/secu-srm>).

⁴⁷ To be used where UNDP is the Implementing Partner

⁴⁸ To be used where the UN, a UN fund/programme or a specialized agency is the Implementing Partner

4. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will: (a) conduct project and programme-related activities in a manner consistent with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards, (b) implement any management or mitigation plan prepared for the project or programme to comply with such standards, and (c) engage in a constructive and timely manner to address any concerns and complaints raised through the Accountability Mechanism. UNDP will seek to ensure that communities and other project stakeholders are informed of and have access to the Accountability Mechanism.
5. In the implementation of the activities under this Project Document, UNDP as the Implementing Partner will handle any sexual exploitation and abuse (“SEA”) and sexual harassment (“SH”) allegations in accordance with its regulations, rules, policies and procedures.
6. All signatories to the Project Document shall cooperate in good faith with any exercise to evaluate any programme or project-related commitments or compliance with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards. This includes providing access to project sites, relevant personnel, information, and documentation.
7. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will ensure that the following obligations are binding on each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient:
 - a) Consistent with the Article III of the SBAA *[or the Supplemental Provisions to the Project Document]*, the responsibility for the safety and security of each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient and its personnel and property, and of UNDP’s property in such responsible party’s, subcontractor’s and sub-recipient’s custody, rests with such responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient. To this end, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall:
 - i. put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;
 - ii. assume all risks and liabilities related to such responsible party’s, subcontractor’s and sub-recipient’s security, and the full implementation of the security plan.
 - b) UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of the responsible party’s, subcontractor’s and sub-recipient’s obligations under this Project Document.
 - c) In the performance of the activities under this Project, UNDP as the Implementing Partner shall ensure, with respect to the activities of any of its responsible parties, sub-recipients and other entities engaged under the Project, either as contractors or subcontractors, their personnel and any individuals performing services for them, that those entities have in place adequate and proper procedures, processes and policies to prevent and/or address SEA and SH.
 - d) Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will take appropriate steps to prevent misuse of funds, fraud or corruption, by its officials, consultants, subcontractors and sub-recipients

in implementing the project or programme or using the UNDP funds. It will ensure that its financial management, anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies are in place and enforced for all funding received from or through UNDP.

- e) The requirements of the following documents, then in force at the time of signature of the Project Document, apply to each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient: (a) UNDP Policy on Fraud and other Corrupt Practices and (b) UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations Investigation Guidelines. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient agrees to the requirements of the above documents, which are an integral part of this Project Document and are available online at www.undp.org.
- f) In the event that an investigation is required, UNDP will conduct investigations relating to any aspect of UNDP programmes and projects. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will provide its full cooperation, including making available personnel, relevant documentation, and granting access to its (and its consultants', subcontractors' and sub-recipients') premises, for such purposes at reasonable times and on reasonable conditions as may be required for the purpose of an investigation. Should there be a limitation in meeting this obligation, UNDP shall consult with it to find a solution.
- g) Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will promptly inform UNDP as the Implementing Partner in case of any incidence of inappropriate use of funds, or credible allegation of fraud or corruption with due confidentiality.

Where it becomes aware that a UNDP project or activity, in whole or in part, is the focus of investigation for alleged fraud/corruption, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will inform the UNDP Resident Representative/Head of Office, who will promptly inform UNDP's Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI). It will provide regular updates to the head of UNDP in the country and OAI of the status of, and actions relating to, such investigation.

- h) UNDP will be entitled to a refund from the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient of any funds provided that have been used inappropriately, including through fraud or corruption, or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Project Document. Such amount may be deducted by UNDP from any payment due to the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient under this or any other agreement.

Where such funds have not been refunded to UNDP, the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient agrees that donors to UNDP (including the Government) whose funding is the source, in whole or in part, of the funds for the activities under this Project Document, may seek recourse to such responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient for the recovery of any funds determined by UNDP to have been used inappropriately, including through fraud or corruption, or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Project Document.

Note: The term "Project Document" as used in this clause shall be deemed to include any relevant subsidiary agreement further to the Project Document, including those with responsible parties, subcontractors and sub-recipients.

- i) Each contract issued by the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient in connection with this Project Document shall include a provision representing that no fees, gratuities, rebates, gifts, commissions or other payments, other than those shown in the proposal, have been given, received, or promised in connection with the selection process or in contract execution, and that the recipient of funds from it shall cooperate with any and all investigations and post-payment audits.
- j) Should UNDP refer to the relevant national authorities for appropriate legal action any alleged wrongdoing relating to the project or programme, the Government will ensure that the relevant national authorities shall actively investigate the same and take appropriate legal action against all individuals found to have participated in the wrongdoing, recover and return any recovered funds to UNDP.
- k) Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall ensure that all of its obligations set forth under this section entitled “Risk Management” are passed on to its subcontractors and sub-recipients and that all the clauses under this section entitled “Risk Management Standard Clauses” are adequately reflected, *mutatis mutandis*, in all its sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into further to this Project Document.

XI. Annexes

1. Project Quality Assurance Report
2. Social and Environmental Screening Template
3. Risk Analysis. Use the standard [Risk Log template](#). Please refer to the [Deliverable Description of the Risk Log](#) for instructions

